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BX  8958  .C53  S5  1876 
Skinner,  Thomas  Harvey,  182 


The  complaint  of 


the  Rev. 


THE  COMPLAINT^<^^,,/----^^,,v 


/ 


Rev.  Thomas  H.  Skinner, 


-^©•-^aiiTSx  i-^nE 


^ 


AT   ITS   FALL   MEETING,    1876, 


ARGUMENT. 


CINCINNATI: 

GAZETTE    COMPANY    PRINT,    FOURTH   AND    VINE   STREETS, 
1876. 


¥'NTRO»UCTION 


WITHIN  less  tlian  a  year  I  have  been,  three  several  times,  deprived 
of  my  constitutional  rights  as  a  free  Presbyter  under  the  very 
banner  of  the  Constitution  itself.  I  have  earnestly  sought  amid  dis- 
organizing movements  to  maintain  our  standards,  and  the  peace, 
purity,  and  unity  of  the  Church,  in  matters  of  grave  moment  to 
every  lover  of  the  truth  and  order  of  the  Presbyterian  Church.  A 
just  Complaint  having  been  regularly  brought  by  me  before  the  Synod 
of  Cincinnati,  and  reported  as  '*  in  order"  by  the  Judicial  Committee, 
and  the  Synod  having  voted  to  hear  the  Complaint,  it  was,  without  even 
a  reconsideration  of  the  vote,  turned  out  of  doors,  under  the  pretense 
of  postponement.  I,  therefore,  present  to  the  attention  of  my  brethren 
the  merits  of  the  specific  case  upon  which  I  asked  the  Synod  to  adjudi- 
cate. The  imputation,  gratuitously  and  injuriously  made  by  the  Pre- 
amble to  the  Resolution  of  the  Synod,  whereby  my  Complaint  was  prac- 
tically ejected  from  the  House,  abundantly  justifies  me  in  publishing 
the  Complaint  itself  and  the  Argument  I  had  prepared  in  its  support. 
Neither  of  them  would  the  Synod  even  hear.  Whether  it  touches  the 
case  of  Mr.  McCune,  every  reader  may  judge  for  himself.  My  brethren 
will  decide  whether  I  had  just  cause  of  complaint  against  the  Presbytery 
and  whether  the  Synod  could  honorably,  as  a  Court  of  Christ,  excuse 
itself  for  refusing  the  hearing  I  demanded  as  my  right,  at  its  last 
meeting.  They  will  judge  upon  whom  rests  the  responsibility  of  the 
causes  of  complaint  to  the  General  Assembly. 

It  has  been  truly  said  by  one  well  versed  in  our  ecclesiastical  law, 
"  it  may  be  doubted  whether  a  similar  arbitrary  unconstitutional  pro- 
ceeding c^n  be  found  in  all  ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  of  the  Presby- 
terian Church."  The  law  of  our  Church,  publicly  cited,  repeated,  and 
urged  in  the  Synod  itself,  declares  that  "  where  there  is  a  right  to 
appeal  and  complain,  there  is  positive  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
judicatory  to  receive  and  issue  such  appeals  and  complaints;"  aud  that 
"  where   ecclesiastical   rights  of  individuals  or  bodies  are    concerned 


there  is  no  discretion  ;  all  such  rights  are  guarded  by  the  constitution 
by  which  every  church  court  is  bound,"  bound  not  only  to  "  receive" 
and  "  issue,"  but  to  "  seasonably  issue,"  during  the  very  same  meeting 
of  the  judicatory,  to  which  the  complaint  or  appeal  has  been  made,  the 
case  having  been  reported  "in  order,"  and  the  records  and  parties 
being  present.  Nothing  but  "an  act  of  God,"  unforeseen,  or  one  or 
other  of  the  grounds  of  postponement  specified  in  our  Digest,  none  of 
which  existed  in  this  case,  is  held  to  justify  any  departure  from  this 
constitutional  law.  No  man  may  be  robbed  of  his  constitutional 
rights  by  arbitrary  power.  Even  on  the  supposition  that  the  McCune 
case  had  been  pending  before  the  lower  court,  yet  this  gave  no  right 
for  the  Synod  to  eject  my  Complaint  from  the  house.  The  Synod 
had  prior  jurisdiction.  Our  Digest  tells  us  that  when  the  pending 
of  one  case  is  set  up  to  defeat  another,  "  the  case  must  be  the  same; 
There  must  be  the  same  parties,  or  at  least  such  as  represent  the  same 
interests,  there  must  be  the  same  rights  asserted,  and  the  same  relief 
prayed  for.  The  identity  in  these  particulars  should  be  such  that, 
if  the  pending  case  had  already  been  disposed  of,  it  could  be  pleaded  in 
bar,  as  a  former  adjudication  of  the  same  matter,  between  the  same 
parties."  And  yet,  in  violation  of  these  clear  principles  of  righteous- 
ness, the  arbiti-ary  power  of  the  Synod  was  used  in  derogation  of 
my  vested  ecclesiastical  rights,  and  the  Synod  ejected  my  Complaint 
by  an  indefinite  postponement,  upon  the  excuse  of  a  perhaps,  which 
neither  civil  nor  ecclesiastical  law  would  tolerate  for  a  moment.  Was 
not  this  a  living  and  practical  illustration  of  the  doctrine,  officially  set 
in  circulation  by  order  of  the  Synod  in  1870,  that  "organic  enactments, 
denominational  laws,  are  the  apples  of  discord  and  wedges  of  division 
in  the  Christian  Church,"  and  ought  not  to  be  "  enforced?"  The 
end  sought  was  gained,  just  as  the  ends  sought  had  been  gained  in  the 
Presbytery.  Nothing  is  left  but  to  complain  to  the  Assembly.  The 
conduct  of  the  Presbytery  for  six  months,  the  twice  taking  from  me 
my  right  and  compelling  a  complaint  to  Synod,  then  the  repetition  by 
the  Synod  of  the  very  offense  it  was  bound  to  rebuke,  and  the  com- 
pulsion again  of  a  Complaint  to  the  Assembly,  tells  its  own  story  and 
shows  where  the  responsibility  rests.  I  might  plead  that  the  Synod's 
action  was  either  a  prejudice  in  favor  of  Mr.  McCune,  or  against  my- 
self, or  both.     I  leave  this  for  others  to  determine. 

A  generation  ago,  the  Presbyterian  Church  was  torn  by  the  very 
principles  and  course  of  action  which  have  agitated  our  ministry  and 
Churches  within  the  bounds  of  the  Synod  of  Cincinnati,  giving  rise  to 
excesses  and  disorganizing  movements  for  years  past,  in  connection, 
among  other  things,  with  temperance  crusades,  women's  preaching,  un- 


licensed  evangelism,  and  anti-denominational  organic  union.  These 
excesses  and  movements,  and  the  practical  destruction  of  a  part  of 
our  Presbyterian  government,  with  tendencies  antagonistic  to  the  whole 
of  it,  I  felt  myself  called  upon,  with  others,  in  conscience  and  loyalty 
to  our  Church,  publicly  to  oppose. 

Therefore,  to  relieve  myself  of  what  I  deem  an  unjust  imputation, 
implied  in  the  resolution  passed  by  the  Synod,  and  to  vindicate  my 
own  honor,  in  the  character  of  my  Complaint  against  the  Presbytery, 
to  that  body,  all  the  more  that  the  Presbyteiy  is  now  about  to  enter 
upon  Mr.  McCune's  case,  I  publish  my  own  Complaint  and  Argument 
for  the  consideration  of  all  concerned,  as  also  for  the  information  of 
the  Church.  I  append  my  protest  against  the  Synod's  action,  and  my 
Complaint  against  the  Synod  to  the  General  Assembly. 

T.  H.  S. 


0OMPLAINT  TO  THE  &YNOD. 


The  undersigned  respectfully  complains  to  the  Synod  of  Cincinnati 
against  the  following  action  of  the  Presbytery  of  Cincinnati,  during  its 
sessions  at  its  stated  fall  meeting,  at  Mt.  Auburn,  September  13  to  15, 
inclusive,  and  at  Cincinnati,  October  3  to  5,  inclusive,  to  wit : 

I.  Jn  sustaining  the  decision  of  the  Moderator,  whereby  my  Freamble 
and  Resolutions  upon  the  case  of  Mr.  McGune  were  ruled  as  out  of  order,  be- 
cause they  were  assumed  to  be  unconstitutional.  The  "point  of  order" 
(so  called)  was  raised  by  Dr.  Morris,  as  follows :  "  That  the  Preamble 
and  Resolutions  just  presented  by  Dr.  Skinner  can  not  be  considered 
by  this  body,  on  the  ground  that  such  consideration  would  be  in  vio- 
lation of  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  Rev.  W.  C.  McCune,  and 
would  be  a  virtual  trial  of  the  said  Mr.  McCune,  without  due  regard 
to  the  forms  provided  for  in  our  constitution."  "The  Moderator  re- 
turned to  the  Chair  and  announced  his  decision  of  the  point  of  order, 
as  follows :  '  The  point  of  order  is  loell  taken,  and  the  Preamble  and 
Resolutions  are  not  in  order.'  The  decision  was  appealed  from,  and 
the  Moderator  sustained." 

My  reasons  of  complaint  against  this  action  are : 

1.  It  was  a  repudiation  by  Presbytery  of  its  vested  constitutional  right 
(Form  of  Grovernment,  Chapter  X,  Section  8)  "  to  condemn  erroneous 
opinions  which  injure  the  purity  or  peace  of  the  Church,"  apart  from 
judicial  process  against  the  author. 

2.  It  was  a  violation  of  'parliamentary  rule,  in  derogation  of  my  con- 
stitutional right  to  introduce  said  Preamble  and  Resolutions,  and  to 
discuss  the  merits  of  the  same  after  they  were  seconded,  and  I  was  en- 
titled to  the  floor,  no  matter  what  their  fate  might  have  been  on  the 
final  vote,  after  discussion. 

3.  Said  decision  of  the  Moderator,  sanctioned  and  sustained  by 
Presbytery,  was  an  exercise  of  the  most  responsible  prerogative  re- 


served  to  the  General  Assembly,  viz.:  that  of  deciding  upon  question?! 
of  constitutional  law,  and  binding  its  interpretation  on  the  court  as  a 
rule  of  action. 

4.  It  was  turning  a  constitutional  question  into  a  parliamentary  rule 
of  order,  so  inventing  a  new  rule,  in  derogation  of  my  constitutional 
and  parliamentary  rights. 

II.  In  accepting,  and  thereby  making  official  documents  of,  the  Special 
Report  and  Collaterals  of  the  Committee  of  Investigation  in  the  case  of  Mr. 
McCune,  loithout  any  action  whatever  to  amsnd  or  to  rectify  statements,  judg- 
ments, and  personalities,  therein  contained,  at  variance  ivith  righteousness  and 
truth.     The  Report  accepted,  Record,  p.  217. 

My  reasons  of  complaint  against  this  action  are  : 

1.  The  Report  opens  with,  and  its  recommendations  rest  upon,  state- 
ments contrary  to  truth. 

2.  It  steps  out  of  its  way  to  raise  a  new  case,  instead  of  confining 
itself  to  the  terms  of  the  resolution  under  which  the  committee  was 
appointed. 

3.  It  implies  a  censure  upon  the  undersigned,  and  recommends  the 
Presbytery  to  pass  a  judgment  which  also  implies  a  censure. 

4.  Part  of  the  Collaterals  indulge  in  gross  personalities  against  the 
undersigned,  which  would  not  be  tolerated  a  moment  in  debate,  and 
ought  not  to  be  tolerated  in  an  official  document. 

III.  For  adopting  an  answer  to  tlw  protest  of  the  undersigned,  September 
15,  1876,  Mt.  Auburn,  without  rectifying  its  errojieou^i  state7neiiis  and  the 
false  impression  it  is  calculated  to  make. 

My  reasons  for  complaint  against  this  action  are : 

1.  Said  answer  does  not  accurately  represent  the  facts  of  the  case. 

2.  It  represents  the  undersigned  as  being  out  of  order  and  furnishing 
reasonable  ground  for  the  annoyances  and  unlawful  interruptions  un- 
der which  he  was  forced  to  retire  from  the  floor  of  the  Presbytery. 

3.  No  withdrawal  of  the  protest,  for  alteration,  on  account  of  mis- 
representations in  the  answer,  could  make  the  protest  "  more  agree- 
able" to  the  **  views''  of  the  undersigned. 

This  Complaint  is  respectfully  submitted,  with  the  request  that  it 
may  be  prosecuted  immediately,  according  to  the  discipline  of  our 
Church. 

Thomas  H.  Skinner. 

Cincinnati,  October  14,  1876. 


Mr.  Moderator,  this  Complaint  limits  itself,  specifically,  to  two 
things:  (1.)  To  the  denial  of  my  constitutional  and  parliamentary 
rights  as  a  Presbyter,  guaranteed  to  me  by  the  standards  of  our 
Church  and  our  accepted  rules  of  parliamentary  order.  (2.)  To  the 
impeachment  of  my  conduct  and  character  as  a  man  and  as  a  minister 
while  in  the  public  defense  of  these  rights,  as  al-fo  in  the  public  defense 
of  our  Presbyterian  faith  and  order.  It  impinges,  in  no  respect,  upon 
the  vierits  of  the  case  of  the  Rev.  Mr.  McCune,  now  in  judicial  pro- 
cess before  the  Presbytery  of  Cincinnati.  It  relates  solely  to  myself 
and  the  Presbytery.  This  Complaint,  Mr.  Moderator,  needs  no  apol- 
ogy. The  utmost  effort  has  been  made,  by  various  parties,  to  try  and 
degrade  the  great  cause  of  Truth  and  Order,  out  of  which  this  Com- 
plaint has  sprung,  to  the  aspect  of  a  mere  personal  quarrel.  "The 
Address  to  all  the  Churches  of  North  America,"  by  the  advocates  of 
anti-denominational  organizations ;  the  wide-spread  advocacy  of  the 
principles  involved  herein  by  so-called  Christian  Church  Union  jour- 
nals, to  which  the  names  and  influence  of  many  Presbyterian  minis- 
ters are  given ;  the  existence  and  character  of  a  new  organization  of 
this  kind  in  the  very  bosom  of  the  Presbytery  of  Cincinnati,  with  its 
published  Declaration  and  Basis ;  the  multiplied  utterances  of  the 
press  throughout  the  land,  both  secular  and  i-eligious,  and  the  action 
of  the  Presbytery  itself  instituting  inquiry  into  the  merits  of  this 
movement,  are  an  abundant  answer  to  so  gratuitous  a  conception.  I 
need,  therefore,  say  no  more  on  this  point.  There  are  three  separate 
counts  in  the  Complaint  I  bring  before  you:  (1.)  As  to  my  constitu- 
tional and  parliamentary  rights.  (2.)  As  to  the  acceptance  of  the 
Committee's  Report  and  its  Collaterals.  (3.)  As  to  the  adoption  of 
the  answer  to  a  protest.  I  complain,  first,  that  my  rights  have  been 
Avrested  from  me;  second,  that  my  conduct  and  character  are  im- 
peached in  accepted  and  official  documents  of  the  Presbytery,  contrary 
to  all  precedent.     Such  is  my  Complaint. 


9 

I.  The  first  point  of  the  Complaint  is  against  Presbytery's  action 
"  in  sustaining  the  decision  of  the  Moderator,  whereby  my  Preamble 
and  Resolutions  upon  the  case  of  Mr.  McCune  were  ruled  as  out  of  or- 
der, because  they  were  assumed  to  be  tmconstitiitional."  (1.)  The  first 
reason  in  support  of  this  first  point  is  that  such  action,  assuming  such 
unconstitutionality,  was  "a  repudiation"  by  Presbytery  of  its  vested  con- 
stitutional right  (Form  of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8)  "to  con- 
demn erroneous  opinions  which  injure  the  purity  and  peace  of  the 
Church,  apart  from  judicial  process  against  their  author." 

I  wish  it  to  be  distinctly  understood  by  the  Synod,  that  the  ground 
on  which  the  Presbytery's  action  rested  was  not  the  mere  inexpediency 
of  the  application  of  non-forensic  or  episcopal  power  to  the  condemna- 
tion of  Mr.  McCune's  errors  and  irregularities,  but  it  was  the  denial 
that  such  episcopal  power,  so  to  do,  did  exist  by  the  constitution.  If  the 
constitutional  power  to  condemn  widely-spread  errors,  apart  from 
judicial  process,  had  been  recognized,  no  ground  would  have  existed 
on  which  to  raise  a  "  point  of  order,"  or  decide  any  one  "  out  of  order" 
who  sought  to  persuade  Presbytery  to  exercise  that  power,  and  save  a 
tedious,  unnecessary  and  vexatious  litigation.  The  only  question  that 
could  have  arisen,  was,  is  it  "  wise,  equitable,  and  for  the  edification 
of  the  Church,"  to  exercise  this  power,  and  to  this  point  my  Preamble, 
Resolution,  and  Argument  were  directed;  i.  e.,  to  a  discussion  of  the 
merits  of  the  case,  in  view  of  the  Committee's  official  report,  furnishing 
the  "facts"  iu  the  case  by  order  of  the  Presbytery,  after  five  months' 
investigation.  If  deemed  contrary  to  the  constitution,  irregular,  unwise, 
inequitable,  and  not  for  edification,  after  hearing  my  argument,  to 
exercise  this  power,  it  was  competent  to  vote  down  my  motion,  or  lay  it 
on  the  table ;  but  I  assert  it  was  an  outrage  upon  all  my  rights  to  shut 
my  mouth,  a  second  time,  upon  a  debatable  motion,  duly  seconded  and 
read,  absolutely  in  order,  and  on  which  I  had  already  proceeded  to 
speak.  At  the  Glendale  Presbytery,  April  13,  1875,  the  plea  of 
official  ignorance  was  made.  The  information  I  came  forward  to  oflTer 
was  declined.  It  was  said  I  could  not  speak  on  the  merits  of  my 
Preamble  until  the  "/acfe"  were  brought  in  by  a  Committee.  The 
Committee  of  Investigation,  consuming  the  summer,  reported  the 
"facts"  September  13,  1875,  indorsing  Mr.  McCune's  course  at 
Lin  wood  and  Mt.  Lookout,  and  although  themselves  disapproving  some 
of  his  views,  yet  reccomraending  no  disapproval  by  the  Presbytery,  but 
suggesting  process  against  myself  for  slander.  The  report  was  not 
adopted,  but  accepted.  It  was  a  discussion  of  the  merits  of  the  case  by 
Mr.  McCune  and  the  Committee.  I  then  took  the  official  documents, 
and  sought  by  a  Preamble  and  Resolution,  to  have  Presbytery  disap- 


10 

prove  both  the  views  and  course  of  Mr.  McCune,  and  forbid  their 
continuance.  My  mouth  was  a  second  time  stopped,  on  the  merits  of 
the  case,  although  having  the  floor,  under  a  debateable  motion  and  per- 
fectly in  order.  What  was  accorded  to  a  Committee  and  to  Mr.  McCune 
apart  from  judicial  process,  was  denied  to  me.  To  support  what  policy, 
and  in  whose  interest  all  this  was  done,  I  leave  others  to  judge.  The 
refusal  to  "consider"  ray  Preamble  and  Resolutions  was  an  oppression. 
To  accomplish  this,  it  was  necessary  to  find  some  ground  on  which  to 
raise  a  "  point  of  order."  I  announce  to  the  Synod  that  the  very  con- 
stitution itself  was  declared  unconstitutional,  and  on  that  ground  I  was 
pronounced  out  of  order,  and  my  rights  to  discuss  the  merits  of  the 
case,  after  Mr.  McCune  had  discussed  them  several  hours  before  Pres- 
bytery, and  the  Committee's  report  had  discussed  them,  was  wrested 
from  me.  It  is  of  this  injustice  I  complain,  all  the  more  that  the  Com- 
mittee itself  had  intimated  to  the  Presbytery  not  to  have  "a  judicial 
trial,"  and  had  not  even  recommended  a  disapproval  of  Mr.  McCune's 
"views,"  and  had  actually  indorsed  his  "course"  at  Linwood  and  Mt. 
Lookout.  It  alters  not  the  injustice  of  the  proceeding,  that,  after 
much  effort  to  throw  this  grave  matter  out  of  court,  and  suggest  action 
against  myself  for  the  public  defense  of  my  rights  and  the  honor  of  my 
Church,  it  was  finally  considered  expedient  to  institute  process  against 
Mr.  McCune.  The  ground  on  which  I  was  ruled  "  out  of  order"  was 
not  the  inexpediency  of  exercising  the  non-judicial  power  of  the  Pres- 
bytery in  condemnation  of  the  errors  before  us,  but  the  denial  of  that 
power  altogether,  and  on  that  ground  wresting  from  me  my  right  of 
discussion.  The  reactionary  half-recognition  of  the  episcopal  power 
of  the  Presbytery  came  later,  only  in  order  to  furnish  a  basis  for  the 
opinion  of  its  non-applicability  to  the  case  in  hand,  and  a  justificati(jn 
of  judicial  process,  but  not  to  allow  me  any  right  of  discussion  on  the 
merits  of  my  Preamble  and  Resolutions.  My  Complaint,  I  think,  is  un- 
derstood. I  shall  show  that  the  Presbytery  has  the  very  power  it  repu- 
diated, that  I  was  in  order,  .and  that  the  action  of  the  Presbytery 
was  an  oppression,  twice  repeated. 

Has  the  Presbytery  the  constitutional  power  to  condemn  erroneous 
opinions  and  irregularities  of  practice,  which  disturb  the  tranquility 
of  the  Church,  apart  from  tedious  and  extreme  forensic  process  ?  My 
conviction  is  clear  that  it  not  only  has  this  right,  but  it  is  in  duty  bound 
to  exercise  it  for  the  edification  of  the  body  of  Christ ;  and  I  think  I 
shall  be  able  to  justify  this  conviction,  deep-seated  and  ineradicable  as  it 
is,  by  the  best  of  evidence  and  sound  argument.  I  shall  adduce  in 
support  of  my  first  reason  the  organic  law  of  the  Church  itself,  estab- 
lished precedents,  approved,  selected,  and  recorded  since  the  reunion, 


11 

in  our  Digest,  for  our  guide,  and  by  the  recognized  practice  of  all  courts 
in  their  interpretation  of  constitutional  law. 

The  whole  power  of  jurisdiction  and  order,  vested  by  Christ  in  the 
Church  of  God  on  earth,  and  iu  every  branch  and  denomination  of 
it  wherever  found,  is  of  divine  right  and  origin,  and  is  limited  alone 
by  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  It  is  for  the 
edification  fif  His  spiritual  body  and  not  for  destruction.  Supervisory 
and  authoritative,  it  is  broad  as  the  inspection  and  control  of  the  whole 
Church  and  adequate  to  all  her  wants  and  necessities.  Its  exercise  is 
directed  to  two  things,  the  preservation  of  the  heavenly  doctrine  in 
its  purity,  and  the  guardianship  of  the  Christian  conduct ;  in  other 
words,  to  faith  and  morals.  Take  these  two  things  away,  truth  and 
duty,  and  neither  Form  of  Government  nor  Code  of  Discipline  has 
any  value.  The  written  Constitution  of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  with 
its  system  of  doctrine  and  polity,  we  declare  to  be  "agreeable  to  the 
Word  of  God,"  and  vow  to  maintain  and  enforce  it  as  the  law  of  the 
Church,  just  because  we  so  believe.  Ministerial  and  declarative  alone, 
and  unfettered  by  human  commandments,  and  neither  legislating  nor 
binding  by  virtue  of  human  authority,  nor  against  the  revealed  will 
of  God,  it  is  the  vice-regal  function  of  the  Church,  derived  from  the 
crown  of  Him  on  whose  shoulders  is  the  government,  who  holds  the 
key  of  David,  and  who  has  said,  "I  give  to  you  the  keys  of  the  king- 
dom. Whatsoever  ye  shall  bind  on  earth  shall  be  bound  in  heaven, 
and  whatsoever  ye  shall  loose  on  earth  shall  be  loosed  in  heaven."  It 
is  an  awful  and  solemn  trust,  and  not  a  "popish  usurpation,"  to  be 
executed  in  view  of  our  accountability  to  Christ  for  the  manner  in 
which  we  defend  the  heavenly  doctrine  and  the  order  of  the  heavenly 
house. 

The  most  general,  or  the  generic,  name  of  this  power  is  "Episco- 
pal." It  is  the  exercise  of  that  ivatch  and  control  which  are  given  to 
those  whom  Christ  has  appointed  and  the  Holy  Ghost  has  chosen  to  be 
ordained  "overseers"  (Episcopoi.  Acts  xx.  28;  1  Tim.  iii.  1,  2)  and 
"  shepherds"  in  the  Church.  It  is  sometimes  called  "  Paternal"  power, 
in  allusion  to  1  Tim.  iii.  4,  5.  Modified  as  to  the  method  of  its  exer- 
cise, in  certain  extreme  cases,  by  judicial  forms  and  rules  of  procedure, 
it  is  called  "  Judicial "  or  "  Forensic."  It  is  the  broadest,  most  compre- 
hensive, and  far-reaching  function  of  government  and  administration 
that  exists ;  the  most  indispensable  to  the  very  existence  of  the  Church 
itself.  It  is  the  character  of  all  her  action.  Deny  to  the  Church  of 
Christ  episcopal  power,  and  she  is  stripped  at  once  of  the  very  means 
of  her  self-preservation  ;  her  oversight  and  control  are  alike  wrecked, 
and  not  even  a  shadow  is  left  on  which  to  shape  her  judicial.     But  this 


12 

is  so  plain  I  need  not  argue  it.  Enough  to  say  that  it  is  by  virtue  of 
this  episcopal  power  alone,  apart  from  judicial  forms,  the  power  of 
supervision  or  inspection,  declarative  and  authoritative,  and  put  by 
Christ  in  ordination  and  the  laying  on  of  hands  upon  the  shoulders  of 
every  presbyter-bishop,  whether  teaching  or  ruling,  and  vested  in  every 
ministerial  court,  the  Church  of  Christ  executes  nearly  the  whole  of 
her  divine  commission.  By  this  she  preaches  the  gospel,  *iministers 
sacraments,  admits  members  and  ministers  into  the  Church  and  dis- 
misses them,  examines,  licenses,  puts,  or  refuses  to  put,  calls  into  the 
hands  of  her  ministers,  elects,  installs,  ordains,  translates,  and  removes 
both  ministers,  elders,  and  deacons.  By  this  she  forms  and  dissolves 
pastoral  relations,  organizes,  visits,  unites  or  divides,  and  commands 
Churches,  redresses  evils,  and  does  whatever  pertains  to  their  welfare. 
By  this  she  requires  candidates  to  pursue  certain  studies  and  report 
their  progress  to  her  courts,  and  calls  upon  her  ministers  to  give  ac- 
count of  their  work  in  the  vineyard  of  the  Lord.  By  this  she  erects 
and  convenes  her  courts,  frames  rules,  and  subjects  to  review  and  con- 
trol their  records  and  proceedings.  She  warns  against  transgression, 
by  this  same  power,  admonishes,  reproves,  rebukes,  exhorts,  entreats, 
enjoins,  defends  the  faith,  directs  the  conduct,  decides  cases  of  con- 
science, suppresses  schismatical  controversies,  arrests  lawless  practices 
against  her  polity,  resolves  questions  of  doctrine  and  discipline  reason- 
ably proposed,  condemns  erroneous  opinions,  and  bears  public  testi- 
mony against  whatever  she  regards  as  injurious  to  the  faith  and  order 
of  God's  house,  and  to  good  manners,  charity,  truth,  and  holiness. 
And  all  this  simply  by  preamble  and  resolution,  motion  and  overture, 
act,  testimony,  and  deliverance,  memorial,  recommendation,  and 
injunction  ; — not  by  process  and  verdict.  Valid  documentary  evidence 
and  present  undeniable  facts,  in  her  own  court,  have  the  sanctity  and 
force  of  a  true  witness.  Moderator,  who  is  it  that  denies  the  episcopal 
power  of  the  Church  of  Christ  ?  or  the  episcopal  power  of  every  court 
in  it?  As  well  deny  that  the  sun  shines  in  the  heavens!  Why  sir, 
what  kind  of  power  was  it  the  Committee  of  the  Presbytery  exercised, 
in  approving  the  "course"  of  Mr.  McCune,  and  disapproving  his 
"views"  apart  from  judicial  process,  and  under  a  Preamble  and 
Resolution  of  Investigation?  What  kind  of  power  is  it  that  the  editor 
of  the  Herald  and  Presbyter  exercised?  And  is  any  one  so  forgetful  of  all 
consistency  as  to  aver  that  the  Presbytery  itself  has  less  power  than  a 
mere  Committee,  the  creature  of  its  own  appointment,  or  than  the  indi- 
vidual editor  of  a  religious  newspaper,  both  using,  in  full,  the  name  of 
the  author,  and  affirming  a  judgment  upon  the  merits  of  the  case?  How 
preposterous  to  think  that  in  the  grave  matters  that  so  often  engage  her 


13 

attention  in  a  wicked  world,  where  the  adversary  ever  works  to  corrupt 
her  faith  and  destroy  her  order,  the  Presbyterian  Church  is  tied,  by 
every  considerable  transgression,  to  an  extreme  forensic  process,  that 
may  consume  a  year  for  its  issue,  and  in  the  end  the  remedy  prove 
worse  than  the  disease !  What  a  harvest  of  practice  for  the  contentious 
and  obstinate,  unwilling  to  be  reclaimed  by  milder  means !  What  a 
premium  on  discord  !  What  a  plight  for  the  Church  of  Christ  in  the 
hands  of  him  who,  abhorring  "jiidicial"  power  and  crying  for  "  peace 
and  safety''  in  the  midst  of  fast  coming  calamities,  denies  the  "  Episco- 
pal" power  too!  Then,  what  is  left  but  fire  and  stubble?  Moderator, 
the  compass  of  1834  will  not  do  for  either  you  or  me  to  steer  by  in  pres- 
ent or  coming  storms !  [t  is  a  question  if  the  anchor  of  Reunion  will 
hold  us,  for  the  gale  is  strong ! 

But  the  Church  is  not  so  bound.  The  recognition  of  this  episcopal 
power  is  inscribed  in  the  constitution,  in  express  terms.  "It  belong- 
eth,"  says  our  admirable  Confession,  Chapter  XXXI,  Section  2,  "  to 
Synods  and  Councils,  ministerially  to  determine  controversies  of  faith 
and  cases  of  conscience,  to  set  down  rules  and  directions  for  the  wor- 
ship of  Grod,  and  government  of  His  Church,  which  decrees  and  deter- 
minations, if  consistent  with  the  Word  of  God,  are  to  be  received  with 
reverence  and  submission,  not  only  for  the  agreement  with  the  Word, 
but  also  for  the  power  whereby  they  are  made,  as  being  an  ordinance 
of  God,  appointed  thereunto  in  his  Word."  The  same  episcopal  power 
is  expressed  again  in  our  Form  of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8, 
which  recognizes  the  "power"  vested  by  Christ  in  the  Presbytery,  not 
merely  to  "  issue  appeals,  from  church  sessions  and  references  brought 
before  them,"  nor  merely  to  "judge  ministers"  by  forensic  process,  but 
also,  and  by  a  discriminating  clause,  "to  resolve  questions  of  doctrine  or 
discipline,  seriously  and  reasonably  proposed,  to  condemn  erroneous 
opinions  which  injure  the  purity  or  peace  of  the  Church,  *  *  and 
to  order  whatever  pertains  to  the  spiritual  welfare  of  the  churches  un- 
der her  care.'"  Again,  with  unmistakable  emphasis  does  our  Book 
of  Discipline,  Chapter  I,  Section  5,  revolt  against  the  idea  that  the 
Church  is  tied  to  extreme  forensic  process  in  the  exercise  of  her  power, 
when  it  declares  that,  "the  exercise  of  discipline  in  such  a  manner  avS 
to  edify  the  Church,  requires  not  only  much  of  the  spirit  of  piety,  but  also 
much  prudence  and  discretion.  It  becomes  the  rulers  of  the  Church, 
therefore,  to  take  into  view  all  the  circumstances  which  may  give  a 
different  character  to  conduct,  and  render  it  more  or  less  offensive ; 
and  which  may,  of  course,  require  a  very  different  mode  of  proceeding  in 
similar  cases,  at  different  times,  for  the  attainment  of  the  same  end." 
What  could  be  more  explicit  ?     Again,  the  same  power,  apart  from 


14 

judicial  process,  is  recognized  as  belonging  to  our  General  Assembly. 
Form  of  Government,  Chapter  XII,  Section  5:  "To  the  General  Assem- 
bly also  belongs  the  power  of  deciding  in  all  controversies  respecting  doc- 
trine and  discipline ;  of  reproving,  warning,  or  bearing  testimony  against 
error  in  doctrine,  or  immorality  in  practice,  in  any  Church,  Presbytery 
or  Synod;  of  suppressing  schismatical  contientions  and  disputations," 
etc'.,  etc.  Thus  is  this  episcopal  power  common  to  all  our  courts, 
without  exception,  for  the  Presbytery  is  only  a  larger  session,  and  the 
Synod  a  larger  Presbytery,  while  the  Assembly  is  the  crown  of  all. 
Will  any  one  say  that  before  error  in  doctrine  and  practice,  in  any 
member  of  a  Presbytery,  can  be  condemned,  or  the  Presbytery  arrest 
lawless  movements  and  condemn  erroneous  views  of  its  members,  or 
bear  testimony  against  error  rife  in  the  Presbyterian  Church,  forensic 
process  against  their  author  must  be  commenced  and  concluded  ?  It  is 
not  the  doctrine  of  the  Presbyterian  Church.  The  best  interpretation 
of  any  organic  instrument  or  statute  is  the  practice  of  its  framers  in  the 
generation  contemporaneous  with  and  succeeding  its  adoption,  and  the 
best  evidence  of  that  practice  is  the  action  of  the  administering  courts 
themselves,  and  the  decrees  and  determinations  of  the  supreme  court 
of  the  Church,  which  have  all  the  force  of  constitutional  law.  "  Con- 
temporanea  expositio  est  optima  et  Jortissima  in  lege" — contemporaneous 
exposition  is  the  best  and  strongest  interpretation  in  law ;  this  is  a 
maxim  of  acknowledged  validity,  universal  and  conclusive.  The  con- 
struction of  the  constitution  by  the  courts  contemporaneous  with  its 
enactment  is  the  surest  construction,  and  next  to  this,  the  practice  of 
the  courts  succeeding.  Such  judicial  interpretation  obtains  the  force 
of  constitutional  law  itself. 

I  appeal,  therefore,  to  five  celebrated  cases  in  our  Digest  which 
testify  to  the  practice  of  the  Church  from  its  very  beginning  in  this 
land,  following  the  practice  of  its  parent  source  and  which  remains 
alike  for  all  future  time,  notwithstanding  the  momentary  obscurations 
of  1822  and  1834,  which  only  prepared  the  way  for  an  intenser  bright- 
ness. And  all  the  more  I  do  this,  again,  at  this  time,  inasmuch  as  it 
has  been  wildly  asserted  in  the  lower  court,  that  the  exceptional 
decisions  of  1822  and  1834  are  today  accepted  law  by  "ninety-nine 
hundredths  of  the  Reunited  Church.'  I  need  only  advert  to  them 
briefly;  they  are  the  cases  of  Harker,  Davis,  Balch,  Craighead  and 
Barnes.  All  these  began  with  the  direct  exercise  of  episcopal  power, 
apart  from  judicial  process;  some  of  them  began,  continued,  and  were 
concluded  by  that  power  alone;  while  others,  which  beginning  with  that 
power  and  failing  by  this  milder  means  to  secure  the  peace  and  purity 
of  the  Church,  were  concluded  by  forensic  adjudication. 


15 

1.  Rarlcer. — Moore's  Digest,  p.  218;  Baird's  Digest,  p.  604.  In 
conformity  with  the  early  practice  of  the  Church,  a  non-judicial  refer- 
ence was  made  to  the  Synod  by  Presbytery  respecting  Mr.  Harker, 
who  had  "imbibed  and  vented  certain  erroneous  doctrines."  "In  1761, 
Mr.  Harker  ;^inted  and  published  his  views,  and  Synod  appointed  a 
committee  to  examine  tJf.e  booh,  who  reported  next  year.  The  Synod 
proceeded  to  consider  Mr.  Barker's  principles,  collected  from  his  booh  by 
the  committee,  which  are  in  substance  as  follows."  After  examination, 
the  Synod  passed  the  following  judgment,  without  any  judicial  process 
whatever.  "The  Synod  judge  that  these  principles  are  of  a  hurtful 
and  dangerous  tendency,  giving  a  false  view  of  the  covenant  of  grace. 
etc.,  etc.,  and  that  they  are  contrary  to  the  Word  of  God  and  our 
approved  standards  of  doctrine."  On  the  further  consideration  of  the 
case,  the  Synod  made  the  following  judgment,  to  wit:  "That  Mr. 
Harker  has  for  several  years  past  been  dealt  with  in  the  tenderest 
manner,  etc.,  etc.,  but  that  instead  of  succeeding  in  these  attempts, 
he  appeared  to  be  rather  confirmed  and  resolute  in  propagating  his 
opinions  among  the  people,  etc.,  etc.  On  the  whole,  though  the 
exclusion  of  a  member  be  grievous,  yet  we  judge  that  the  said  Mr. 
Samuel  H&rker  can  not  be  consistently  a  member  of  this  body,  and 
accordingly  declare  him  disqualified  for  preaching  and  exercising  his 
ministry,"  etc.  Such  was  the  case.  The  fathers  of  the  Church  exer- 
cised their  episcopal  power  in  "condemning  erroneous  opinions,"  and 
finally  excluded  a  contumacious  member,  apart  from  judicial  process. 

2.  Balch.— Moore's  Digest,  p.  220 ;  Baird,  p.  614.  Mr.  Balcb,  in 
1797,  having  imbibed  Hopkinsian  doctrines,  propagated  them,  caiusing 
a  schism  in  the  Church,  and  the  erection  of  a  new  independent  organi- 
Kation.  The  "creed"  of  Mr.  Balch,  gathered  by  a  commission,  was 
referred  to  the  General  Assembly,  without  any  judicial  process  against 
its  author,  asking  that  the  author  be  required  to  "  acknowledge  before 
the  Assembly  that  he  was  wrong  in  the  publication  of  his  creed, 
renounce  the  errors  pointed  out,  engage  to  teach  nothing  hereafter  of 
a  similiar  nature,  and  that  the  Moderator  admonish  him,"'  etc.  Mr. 
Balch  acknowledged  his  errors:  "I  do  fully  acknowledge,"  etc.,  did 
"  cheerfully  renounce  them,"  did  "solemnly  and  sincerely  engage,"  etc., 
did  "cheerfully  submit  himself  to  admonition,"  and  was  declared  "in 
good  standing  in  the  Church."  It  was  an  exercise  of  episcopal  power 
by  the  fathers  of  the  Church,  under  the  organic  law  of  the  Church. 

3.  Z>ams.— Moore's  Digest,  p.  222;  Baird,  p.  634.  The  Second 
Presbytery  of  South  Carolina,  in  the  exercise  of  its  episcopal  power, 
"represented"  to  the  Synod  that  Mr.  Davis,  belonging  to  the  First 
Presbytery,  was  permitted  to  "  pass  without  censure,  though  known  to 


16 

teach  erroneous  doctrines  on  some  fundamental  points."  Synod  required 
the  Presbytery  to  "attend  to  this  matter."  After  various  efforts, 
charges  were  tabled  by  the  Second  Presbytery,  and  abandoned,  Mr. 
Davis  being  excused  from  censure,  on  the  ground  of  "  liberty  of  opinion." 
Synod  then  commenced  a  "judicial  investigation,"  and,  fflially,  referred 
the  matter  to  the  Assembly.  The  Synod's  actii)u  was  declared  irregular 
in  proceeding  to  such  judicial  investigation,  when  there  was  "no  refer- 
ence and  no  appeal,"  and  the  next  Assembly  refused  to  "reconsider." 
This  action  was  just,  because  the  Synod  was  not  a  court  of  original 
jurisdiction  over  a  minister.  It,  however,  considered  an  "overture"  from 
the  Synod  of  the  Carolinas,  "requesting  their  attention  to  a  late 
publication  of  the  Rev.  W.  C.  Davis,  denominated  the  Gospel  Plan." 
The  finding  upon  the  overture  was,  that  the  doctrines  of  Mr.  Davis  are 
"  contrary  to  the  Confession  of  Faith  and  the  Word  of  Grod,"  "of  very 
dangerous  tendency,"  and  the  "Assembly  do  judge,  and  do  hereby 
declare,  that  the  preaching  or  publishing  them  ought  to  subject  the 
person  or  persons  so  doing,  to  be  dealt  with  by  their  respective  Presby- 
teries according  to  the  discipline  of  the  Church  relative  to  the  propa- 
gation of  errors."  Judicial  process  was  commenced  in  a  new  Presbytery, 
to  which  Mr.  Davis  was  attached,  his  former  Presbyte'ry  having 
been  dissolved.  Mr.  Davis  decliiied  jurisdiction  and  was  deposed  from 
the  ministry.  The  fact  is  patent  that  by  episcopal  power  the  errors  and 
course  of  Mr.  Davis  were  condemned,  upon  overture  alone,  apart  from, 
the  conduct  of  a  regular  judicial  trial. 

4.  Craighead.— 'Moore's  Digest,  p.  223;  Baird,  p.  638.  Mr.  Craig- 
head having  preached  a  Pelagianizing  sermon  before  Synod,  in  1806, 
"  the  things  he  uttered  before  the  Synod  were  immediately  submitted 
to  that  court  by  the  Committee  of  Bills  and  OoeHures."  (Princeton 
Review,  October,  1847,  p.  196.)  He  was  admonished  on  the  spot, 
formally  by  the  Synod,  in  the  exercise  of  its  episcopal  power,  through 
the  Moderator,  to  abstain  from  the  propagation  of  his  views.  He  "set 
at  naught  the  admonition  "  of  the  Synod,  determined  to  keep  on  in  his 
way,  and  published  the  sermon.  Judicial  process  was  afterward 
resorted  to.  In  the  course  of  it,  the  Assembly  said,  in  1824,  "  The 
Synod  might  have  proceeded  instantly  to  condemn  the  errors  of  Mr. 
Craighead's  book,  as  the  Assembly  did  the  "  Gospel  Plan"  of  W.  C. 
Davis,"  that  is,  even  without  judicial  process.  (Baird,  642.)  It  recog- 
nized the  right  to  exercise  episcopal  power,  not  only  in  the  condemna- 
tion of  error,  but  for  a  "  lofty  and  independent  spirit,  that  would  not  be 
controlled  by  authority,"  from  "  a  bold  and  confident  controvertist, 
who  sets  his  opponents  at  defiance." 

5.  Barnes.— Moore's  Digest,  p.  226;    Baird,  p.  650.     In  1829,  Mr. 


17 

Barnes  preached  the  "  Way  of  Salvation,"  the  sermon  causing  public 
discussion.  Next  year  the  Presbytery  of  Philadelphia  allowed  a  call 
from  the  First  Church  of  Philadelphia  to  be  placed  in  his  hands.  A 
minority  protested  and  complained  that  the  proper  consideration 
of  hife  views  was  suppressed,  and  the  right  of  the  Presbytery  to 
pronounce  upon  those  views,  apart  from  judicial  process,  denied. 
Synod  sustained  the  complaint  of  the  minority,  and  enjoined  Pres- 
bytery "to  hear  and  decide  on  their  objections  to  the  orthodoxy  of 
the  sermon  of  Mr.  Barnes,  and  to  take  such  order  on  the  whole  sub- 
ject as  is  required  by  a  regard  to  the  purity  of  the  Church  and  its  ac- 
knowledged doctrines  and  order."  Obedient  to  this  injunction,  Pres- 
bytery, apart  from  judicial  process,  "entered  into  an  examination  of 
Mr.  Barnes'  sermon,  and  decided  as  follows:  Presbytery,  etc.,  "are  of 
the  opinion  that  it  contains  speculations  of  dangerous  tendency,"  etc. 
(reciting  the  points),  and,  "on  the  whole,  express  their  deep  regret 
that  Mr.  Barnes  should  have  preached  and  published  a  discourse  so 
highly  objectionable,"  etc.,  "and  earnestly  recommend  to  Mr.  Barnes 
to  reconsider  and  renounce  the  erroneous  matter,"  etc.,  and  appointed 
a  committee  to  wait  upon  Mr.  Barnes,  and  report  the  result  of  their 
interview  at  the  next  meeting.  Mr.  Barnes  refused  to  hear  the  com- 
mittee, resisted  the  exercise  of  the  episcopal  power  of  the  Presbytery, 
pronouncing  "  the  whole  proceeding  unconstitutional "  This  was  fall- 
ing back,  not  on  the  early  practice  of  the  Church,  but  upon  a  new  in- 
terpretation of  the  constitution  given  in  1822.  The  whole  matter  was  now 
referred  directly  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Presbyterian  Church, 
with  the  folloAving  question,  viz.:  "  Whether,  by  the  constitution,  it  is 
competent  to  any  Presbytery  to  take  up  and  examine  any  printed  pub- 
lication, and  to  pronounce  it  to  be  erroneous  or  dangerous,  if  they  so 
find  it,  witlioui  in  the  first  i^lace  eominencing  a  formal  prosecution  of  the 
author,  even  supposing  it  to  be  known  and  admitted  that  the  author  is 
a  member  of  its  own  body ;  or  whether  a  Presbytery,  in  every  such 
case,  mu&t,  when  disposed  to  act  on  the  same,  forthwith  commence  a 
forensic  prosecution  of  the  author  of  the  publication  which  is  believed  to 
contain  erroneous  and  dangerous  opinions  or  doctrines  ? "  Baird,  pp. 
654,  655.  It  is  the  question  of  episcopal  power,  as  to  its  extent,  raised 
in  1831,  notwithstanding  the  previous  and  uniform  practice  of  the 
Church,  save  once,  in  1822,  which  was  counteracted  by  the  action  of 
1824. 


The  following  correspondence  with  one  well  qualified  to  judge  in  the 
matter  presented,  I  here  insert : 


18 

Cincinnati,  October  15,  1876. 

Bro.  Bairij  :  Will  you  be  so  kin4  as  to  give  me  your  opinion  in  re- 
spect to  the  five  cases — Balch,  Davis,  Harker,  Craighead  and  Barnes — 
named  in  the  Digest,  and  state  whether  they  are  cases  in  which  the 
episcopal  poiver  of  the  Presbytery,  in  so  far  as  it  may  be  distinguished 
from  judicial  or  forensic  process,  was  exercised. 

Yours  fraternally,  etc. 


Cincinnati,  October  16,  1876. 

Dear  Brother:  By  "judicial  or  forensic  process"  I  understand 
you  to  mean,  proceedings  implying  the  presence  of  a  prosecutor  and 
defendant  and  forms,  the  essential  features  of  which  are  stated  in  our 
book,  in  the  chapter  on  Actual  Process. 

Episcopal  jurisdiction,  as  contrasted  with  this,  must  mean  that  au- 
thority by  which,  without  an  intervening  prosecutor,  or  the  forms  of 
actual  process.  Church  courts  act  immediately  and  of  their  own  knowl- 
edge for  the  correction  of  disorders,  the  reclaiming  of  wanderers,  and 
the  protection  of  the  Church  and  its  doctrines. 

Of  proceedings  of  this  kind,  respecting  which  you  inquire,  the  rec- 
wds  of  the  Church  exhibit  a  number  of  memorable  examples.  C,on- 
spicuous  among  them  are  the  cases  of  Harker,  Balch,  Davis,  Craighead 
and  Barnes.  In  each  of  these  cases  the  episcopal  authority  was  em- 
ployed in  examining  and  censuring  the  published  opinions  of  the  par- 
ties. In  the  Harker  case,  the  Synod,  without  any  of  the  forms  of  ac- 
tual process,  having  first  censured  Barker's  book,  eventually  excluded 
him  from  the  ministry  for  contumacy  and  persistency  in  error.  In  the 
other  cases,  the  episcopal  function  was  exercised  in  censure  of  the  pub- 
lications, and  its  action  was  followed,  more  or  less  directly,  by  meas- 
ures of  forensic  or  judicial  process. 

Two  other  signal  examples  of  episcopal  jurisdiction  you  will  find  in 
the  New  Light  and  Cumberland  Schisms.  In  both  instances  the  Sy- 
nod of  Kentucky  asserted  direct  epi.scopal  authority  over  unsound  min- 
isters, citing  them  to  its  bar,  examining  them  as  to  their  opinions  and 
conduct,  and  suspending  them  from  their  ministry.  And  in  both  cases 
the  General  Assembly,  after  mature  inquiry  into  the  whole  proceed- 
ings, fully  approved  them. 

1  could  mention  other  instances,  but  these  may  serve  you  as  exam- 
ples of  the  whole.  In  fact,  it  is,  I  think,  beyond  question  that  in  all 
periods  of  the  history  of  our  Church,  from  the  beginning  until  a  com- 
paratively recent  date,  the  episcopal  function  was  in  constant  exercise, 
and  its  righteousness  unquestioned  by  any. 

Yours,  very  truly, 

Samuel  J.  Baird. 

The  fortunes  of  this  new  movement,  that  sought  to  confirm  a  novel 
and  unwarranted  interpretation  of  our  organic  law,  I  need  not  recount. 


19 

They  are  spread  at  length  in  Baird's  Digest,  pp.  650  to  733,  to  which 
Moore's  Digest,  p.  226,  refers,  traversing  a  painful  conflict  of  seven 
years.  It  was  a  time  of  trouble.  Must  the  author  of  every  erroneous 
and  dangerous  sentiment  be  put  on  trial  before  the  errors  of  his  publi- 
cations, whether  by  book,  or  pamphlet,  or  newspaper,  and  his  irregu- 
larities, be  condemned  ?  To  what,  in  troublous  times,  would  the  Church 
be  reduced,  save  a  police  court  or  an  arena  of  interminable  strife? 

The  answer  of  the  Assembly  of  1834  to  the  above  question,  an  an- 
swer which  led  directly  to  the  disruption  of  the  Church,  because  it  de- 
nied to  the  Church  her  right  to  condemn  erroneous  opinions  apart  from 
the  arraignment  of  the  author,  was  in  these  words  :  "That  in  the  opin- 
ion of  this  Assembly,  to  take  up,  and  try,  and  condemn,  any  'printed 
publications  as  heretical  and  dangex'ous,  is  equivalent  to  condemning  the 
author  as  heretical ;  that  to  condemn  heresy  in  the  abstract  can  not  be 
understood  as  the  purpose  of  such  trial ;  that  the  results  of  such  trial 
are  to  bear  upon,  and  seriously  to  aSect,  the  standing  of  the  author ; 
and  the  fair  and  unquestionable  mode  of  procedure  is,  if  the  author 
be  alive  and  known  to  be  of  our  communion,  to  institute  process  against 
him,  and  give  him  a  fair  and  constitutional  trial."  Baird,  p.  669  (8). 
The  peculiar  introduction  of  the  word  "try"  in  its  technical  meaning, 
and  in  an  illegitimate  application  to  the  phrase,  "printed  publications," 
as  though  any  court  could  ever  dream  of  instituting  forensic  process 
against  a  book,  an  opinion,  or  a  thing,  is  evidently  inappropriate.  The 
protest  to  this  answer  was  this :  "  We  protest,  because  in  our  judgment 
this  decision  not  only  establishes  a  principle  erroneous  in  itself,  but 
does  in  fact  the  very  thing  which  it  imputes  to  the  memorialists;  it 
casts  censure  on  a  former  General  Assembly  for  examining  and  con- 
demning a  heretical  book  before  the  author  was  tried  and  condemned 
by  bis  Presbytery.  We  here  refer  to  the  case  of  W.  C.  Davis." 
Baird,  671. 

I  gladly  and  thankfully  pass  over  the  history.  Would  there  were 
nothing  here  to  recall  the  past!  In  1834  the  exercise  of  the  episco- 
pal power,  in  this  respect,  was  denied.  In  1835,  and  in  1837,  it  was 
triumphantly  reaffirmed  by  the  Presbyteries  in  General  Assembly.  I 
quote  the  action  of  the  Assembly  of  1835:  '^Resolved  that,  in  the 
judgment  of  this  General  Assembly,  it  is  the  right,  and  may  be  the 
duty,  of  an?/ judicatory  of  our  Church  to  take  up,  and,  if  it  see  cause, 
to  bear  testimony  against  any  printed  publication  which  may  be  circu- 
lating in  its  bounds,  and  which  in  the  judgment  of  that  judicatory  may 
be  adapted  to  inculcate  injurious  opinions,  and  this  whether  the  author 
be  living  or  dead,  whether  he  be  in  the  communion  of  this  Church  or 
not,  whether  he  be  a  member  of  the  judicatory  c  h-jni  ng  tlie  opinion,  or  of 


20 

some  other.  *  *  *  To  deny  to  our  judicatories,  as  guardians  of  the 
churches,  this  right,  would  be  to  deny  to  them  one  of  the  most  precious 
and  poiverfid  means  of  bearing  testimony  against  dangerous  sentiments, 
and  guarding  the  children  of  the  Church  against  "that  instruction 
which  causeth  to  err."  No  counter  decision  to  this  has  ever  been 
made.  The  action  of  the  Assembly  of  1836,  of  which  my  own  father 
was  the  author,  and  which  I  well  understand,  did  not  antagonize  with 
the  definitive  action  of  1835,  which  is  a  pi-ecedent  that  can  not  be  set 
aside  in  the  Keunited  Church.  Just  what  the  Assembly  of  1836  did, 
was  simply  to  maintain  that,  to  episcopally  condemn  the  errors  of  a 
publication,  which  errors  the  Assembly  had  already  decided  not  to  be 
errors,  after  the  formal  judicial  trial  of  their  author  for  the  same,  was 
improper,  and  in  contravention  of  the  rights  of  the  author,  as  also  a 
reversal  of  its  own  decision  upon  the  merits  of  the  errors  themselves. 
Baird's  Digest,  p.  694  (3,  4,  5).  Whatever  difference  of  opinion 
might  have  existed  as  to  the  errors  themselves,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  position  taken  was  correct,  and  in  this  view  I  have  the  sanc- 
tion of  my  father  himself. 

What  then.  Moderator,  is  the  result  we  have  reached?  It  is  no  less 
than  this:  (1.)  That  the  express  letter  of  our  constitution  asserts  the 
right  of  every  oue  of  our  Presbyteries  and  of  other  courts  to  condemn 
error  in  doctrine  and  irregularity  in  practice  arising  therefrom,  apart 
from  judicial  arraignment  of  the  author.  (2.)  That  our  earlier  and 
later  assemblies  and  inferior  courts  have  done  this  very  thing,  not 
merely  "in  the  abstract,"  as  in  the  cases  of  Universalism  and  Socinian- 
ism,  etc.,  but  in  the  concrete,  in  any  publication,  whether  book,  ser- 
mon, or  pamphlet,  set  on  foot  by  any  one,  dead  or  alive,  member  of  a 
Presbytery  or  not,  and  referring  to  the  publication  by  title  and  to  the 
author  of  the  publication  by  name.  (3.)  That  five  memorable  his- 
toric precedents  or  actual  cases  in  court  confirm  and  illustrate  this 
exercise  of  episcopal  power ;  and  (4.)  That  judicial  process  against 
the  author,  or,  in  other  words,  the  judicial  arrest  of  the  person,  whether 
by  responsible  prosecutor  or  by  common  fame,  instead  of  the  examina- 
tion and  disapproval  of  the  thing,  is  not  the  first  but  always  the  last 
resort ;  and  this  I  affirm  is  the  genius  of  our  constitution,  an  instru- 
ment framed  and  fraught  alike  with  the  spirit  of  wisdom  and  charity, 
conservative  alike  of  its  doctrine  and  order  and  the  standing  of  our 
ministry,  the  best  possible  means  to  save  both  the  Church  and  her 
public  teachers  from  defection  and  destruction. 

And  now.  Moderator,  this  is  the  law  of  our  Church,  its  established 
law,  by  the  perpetual  power  of  the  standards,  by  memorable  exposi- 
tions and  precedents  in  all  our  courts,  contemporaneous  with  and  sue- 


21 

ceediug  the  enactment  of  our  constitution,  and  by  the  latest  as  well  as 
earliest  deliverances  of  our  supreme  court.  I  advance  now  to  say, 
that  it  is  the  law  of  our  Church,  established  triumphantly  also  by  the 
maxims  of  common  law  and  common  sense,  as  well  as  by  the  univer- 
sally recognized  rules  and  decisions  of  all  civil  courts,  where  contradic- 
tory decisions  have  existed  in  the  same  court  upon  questions  of  law 
over  which  the  court  has  proper  jurisdiction.  It  has  been  confidently 
asserted  in  the  Presbytery  that  the  decision  of  1834  is  the  law  of  the 
Presbyterian  Church,  and  so  regarded  by  'ninety-nine  hundredths"  of 
the  reunited  body — a  marvelous  assertion,  truly  !  Certainly  the  novel 
interpretation  of  1822  was  slain  by  the  latter  contrary  interpretation 
of  1824.  Upon  what  principle,  may  I  ask,  is  that  of  1834  exalted 
in  force  above  the  still  later  and  contrary  interpretation  of  1835  in 
the  undivided  Church  ?  Not,  certainly,  upon  any  principle  of  legal 
interpretation,  either  literal,  rational,  historical,  or  mixed.  Not,  cer- 
tainly, upon  the  ground  of  the  early  practice  of  the  Church,  uninter- 
rupted, untd  1822.  Such  logic  is  in  face  of  all  reason,  all  law,  all 
sense,  and  is  repugnant  to  the  rule  accepted  by  all  judges  and  enforced 
in  all  civil  courts.  ''Stare  decisis  et  quieta  non  movere " — to  stand  by  the 
decisions  and  not  to  disturb  rights  and  principles  at  rest — is  an  ac- 
knowledged rule.  Judicial  interpretations  of  the  constitution,  con- 
temporaneous with  its  enactment  and  giving  the  sense  of  its  framers, 
will  be  upheld.  The  construction  of  the  law  by  the  courts  having 
jurisdiction  in  the  case,  at  the  time  and  afterward,  is  the  surest  and 
best  construction,  and  no  modal  limitation  is  to  be  inferred  which  may 
defeat  the  plain  intent  of  the  law.  A  principle  once  established  and 
continued,  under  the  construction  of  the  supreme  court  which  has 
jurisdiction  over  questions  of  constitutional  law,  is  to  be  maintained 
as  the  law  of  the  land.  The  construction  of  the  court  obtains  the 
force  and  acquires  the  sanction  of  constitutional  law  itself.  While  the 
constitution  remains  unchanged  the  construction  remains  unchanged 
also.  ''Stare  decisis" — abide  by  the  decisions.  Otherwise  a  change 
of  construction,  in  the  interest  of  any  excitement,  strikes  at  the  foun- 
dation of  all  principles  and  all  rights  confirmed  under  the  previous 
construction  and  opens  the  door  to  interminable  strife.  The  Assem- 
blies of  1822  and  1834  violated  this  wholesome  maxim.  They  did  not 
"abide  by  the  decisions."  They  did  disturb  the  "principles  and 
rights  at  rest."  They  uttered  contradictory  decisions  to  the  old,  and 
paved  the  way  for  what  followed.  Contemporaneous  exposition  was 
against  them.  An  uninterrupted  practice  until  1822  was  against 
them.  It  was  incumbent  on  the  Assemblies  of  1835  and  1837,  in  the 
yet  undivided  Church,  to  reclaim  and  reinstate  the  early  and  true 


22 

construction  of  the  clause  in  our  constitution,  which  acicnowleclges  the 
vested  right  of  Presbytery  "  to  condemn  erroneous  opinions  which 
injure  the  peace  and  purity  of  the  Church,"  and  set  aside  the  interpre- 
tation of  1834,  or  else  allow  the  new  construction,  antagonistic  to  the 
plain  intent  of  the  law  and  the  whole  spirit  of  our  constitution.  For 
who  does  not  know  that,  where  contradictory  decisions  exist,  the  "  last 
decision"  is  sdways  in  force  until  reversed.  Again  I  invoke  the  ac- 
knowledged maxims  of  law  by  which  the  courts  of  law  are  governed  : 
"  Jiidicia  poster  lor  a  sunt  in  lege  fortiora" — the  later  decisions  are  the 
stronger  in  law  ;  "  Judieiis posterioribus  fides  est  adhibenda" — ^fuU  faith  is 
to  be  had  in  the  later  decisions;  "  Judlcia  posteriora priora  abrogant" — 
later  decisions  annul  the  earlier  contrary  ones.  Nothing  is  more  settled. 
The  last  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  on  a  question 
of  constitutional  law  will  stand  and  be  respected  as  against  any  former 
contradictory  one,  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  last  decision  of  the 
General  Assembly,  the  supreme  court  of  the  Church,  in  its  construc- 
tion of  the  clause  in  question.  Just  as  in  legislation  a  later  statute 
repeals  the  former  contradictory  one,  so  in  adjudication  the  later  judg- 
ment of  the  court  annuls  the  prior  ones  in  conflict  therewith  ;  and 
this  is  true  in  cases  both  of  original  and  appellate  jurisdiction.  The 
last  decision  of  the  Greneral  Assembly  is  final,  authoritative,  and  bind- 
ing on  all  inferior  courts  over  which  it  has  jurisdiction,  whether  Synods, 
Presbyteries,  or  Sessions. 

By  what  right,  then,  Moderator,  in  law,  in  logic,  in  reason,  in  sense, 
or  history,  can  any  one  assert  that  the  decision  of  1834  is  of  superemi- 
nent  authority  and  binding  force,  as  against  |he  later  decision  of  1835, 
which  occurred  in  the  undivided  Church?  Does  opposition  to  the 
decision  of  1835  constitute  law,  especially  when  no  counter  subsequent 
decision  of  the  Assembly  is  to  be  found?  All  the  more,  again,  by  what 
right,  when,  by  the  very  terms  of  our  Reunion,  we  accept  as  law  that 
which  was  legally  established  antecedent  to  the  division  of  1838,  and 
our  "Concurrent  Declarations"  affirm  that  the  rules  and  precedents  of 
each  branch  of  the  Church,  only  subsequent  to  that  division,  shall  not  be. 
regarded  as  law,  unless  "approved  by  both  the  bodies"  and  "  re-estab- 
lished in  the  united  body?" 

The  use,  by  Presbytery,  of  an  author's  nayne,  or  of  his  publication, 
in  condemning  erroneous  doctrines,  publicly  propagated  by  book, 
pamphlet,  newspaper,  and  circulated  over  the  author's  ovvn  signature, 
or  preached  from  the  pulpit,  advocated  in  special  lectures  on  the  plat- 
form, and  advertised  from  place  to  place,  can  form  no  valid  matter  of 
objection  to  the  exercise  of  episcopal  power.  It  is  only  what  occurs 
in  every   public  discussion    and  literary  criticism   of  the    works  of 


23 

theologians  and  moralists.  The  author  uses  it  himself,  and  is  well 
known.  The  position  that  to  condemn  the  erroneous  opiniom  or  doc- 
Urines  of  a  man  is  to  condemn  the  man  himself  as  a  heretic,  is  un- 
charitable, unhistoric,  unscriptural  and  illogical; — uncharitable  to  ths 
court,  for  it  subjects  the  court  to  the  imputation  of  an  attempt  t« 
secure,  by  indirection,  a  censure  of  the  author,  which  it  may  fail  to 
gain  by  judicial  action,  so  forcing  a  construction  of  the  act  of  the 
court  that  can  not  be  justified  ; — uncharitable,  also,  to  the  author,  for  it 
labors  to  carry  over  to  the  author,  who  is  always  more  and  better  than 
his  errors,  a  disapproving  judgment  that  bears  against  the  error* 
alone.  It  is  unhistoric  and  unscriptural,  for,  in  all  ages  of  the  Church, 
apostolic  and  post-apostolic,  and  under  all  forms  of  discipline,  only  he 
is  called  a  "  heretic  "  who  obstinately  and  contumaciously  declines  to 
hear  the  admonition  of  the  Church.  So  Bingham  shows,  a.s  I  shall 
.  hereafter  quote.  So  the  Apostle  instructs  us :  "A  man  that  is  a  heretic, 
after  the  first  and  second  admonition,  reject,"  It  is  illogical  on  many 
accounts,  for  it  assumes  that  a  judgment  against  erroneous  doctrine  19 
a  judgment  against  the  person,  character,  and  standing,  of  the  author. 
And  yet,  in  the  same  breath,  severe  judicial  process  is  invoked  ta 
secure  the  very  end  apparently  so  much  deplored!  This  is  inconsistent, 
for  surely  the  exercise  of  authoritative  non-judicial  power  is  milder 
and  more  tender  than  the  exercise  of  forensic  procedure, — for  while  a 
judgment  against  the  author,  by  judicial  process,  aims  at  the  person, 
character,  standing  and  usefulness  of  the  man,  a  judgment  against  the 
thing  alone,  leaves  the  person,  character,  standing,  usefulness  un- 
touched. Pride  may  object,  but  neither  justice  nor  reason  can. 
Peter's  standing  was  not  impaired  by  Paul's '  reproof  at  Antioch, 
neither  were  the  churches  of  Cilicia  and  Syria  injured  by  the  injune- 
tion  of  the  Jerusalem  Council. 

The  objection,  moreover,  assumes  that  because  the  author  of  error 
is  under  the  jurisdiction  of  some  Presbytery,  therefore  no  judgment 
can  emerge  against  his  error,  except  upon  judicial  process.  Formal 
verdict  of  "guilty,"  as  in  the  case  of  "crime,"  must  be  found  and 
formally  declared.  The  whole  man  and  his  opinions  must  be  so 
chained  together,  under  the  categories  of  moral  guilt  and  crime,  that 
no  admonition  may  be  allowed,  and  no  injunction  be  imposed,  except 
upon  a  personal  conviction.  That  is,  the  mere  fact  of  jurisdiction,  or 
jurisdiction,  ipso  facto,  compels  extreme  forensic  process.  But  tjiis 
is  a  petitio.  Jurisdiction  does  not,  ex  necessitate,  compel  forensic  pro- 
cess against  the  author.  It  is  simply  a  dictio  juris,  or  saying  of  the 
law,  that  both  the  man  and  his  doctrines  are  amenable  to  the  authority 
of  some  particular  court,  to  be  dealt  with  in  any  one  of  the  different 


24 

constitutional  modes  deemed  best  for  the  edification  of  tiie  Church. 
Jurisdiction  imposes  no  necessity  for  this,  rather  than  that,  procedure. 
Such  necessity  rests  on  otlier  grounds. 

The  objection  still  further  assumes  that  the  clause,  Form  of  Govern- 
ment, Chap.  X,  Sec.  8,  means  only  a  condemnation  of  error  in  thesi, — in 
other  words,  the  Presbytery  is  shut  up  either  to  judicial  arraignment 
of  the  author,  or  to  a  deliverance  against  an  abstraction.  But  what 
is  the  character  of  this  abstraction  ?  Where  shall  we  find  it  ?  Where 
there  is  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  erroneous  doctrine,  it  binds  to  judicial 
process,  it  is  alleged.  The  logical  consequence  of  this  is,  there  can 
be  no  such  tiling  as  a  condemnation  of  error  in  the  abstract  hiside  of 
the  Presbyterian  Church,  no  matter  how  wide-spread  or  rife  it  may  be, 
for  all  persons  inside  the  Presbyterian  Church  are  wndeviiii  jurisdiction, 
and  where  there  is  jurisdiction  over  error,  judicial  process,  it  is  argued, 
must  obtain.  Fate  is  not  more  inevitable  than  the  logical  conclusion 
from  these  premises,  that  "  error  in  ike  abstract "  means  error  outside  of 
the  Presbyterian  Church,  that  is,  outside  of  its  jurisdiction.  The 
Presbyterian  Church,  therefore,  can  condemn  erroneous  opinions,  rife  in 
her  own  bosom,  in  no  other  way  than  by  the  judicial  trial,  in  detail,  of 
every  man  who  holds  them,  became  every  man  is  under  her  jurisdic- 
tion !  Condemnation  of  error  in  thesi,  therefore,  means  condemnation 
of  error  oxitside  of  the  Presbytervm  Church !  And  this  is  what  is 
meant  by  the  clause  in  Form  of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8! 
The  whole  authoritative  character  of  the  Presbyteiy,  in  relation  to 
error  in  doctrine,  inside  of  the  Church,  is  reduced  to  judicial  process. 
To  such  absurdity  are  we  brought  by  objecting  to  the  use  of  a  name  ! 
See  Baird's  Digest,  *p.  669  (8);  672,  "^120;  730,  §168;  731  (4). 
Against  such  illogical  position  the  decision  of  1835  was  directed;  a 
decision  still  of  binding  force.  It  is  gratuitous  to  say  that  the  clause, 
Form  of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8,  means  only  condemna- 
tion in  thesi,  whether  inside  or  outside  our  jurisdiction.  The  book 
does  not  say  so.  The  interpretation  is  a  gloss,  not  an  exposition ;  a 
modal  limitation  upon  the  law,  imported  into  the  text,  not  drawn 
from  it ;  a  restriction  of  its  broad  intent,  which  no  jurist  would  decree 
as  just.  Action  in  thesi  is  included,  but  the  vested  power  of  the 
Presbytery,  under  that  clause,  is  not  limited  thereto.  The  criticism, 
that  the  exercise  of  episcopal  power  against  error  would  cast  some 
reflection  on  the  author,  is  sentimental.  It  is  the  duty  of  Diotrephes, 
Alexander  the  coppersmith,  Demas,  Hymeueus  and  Philetus,  to  make 
such  reflection  impossible.  But  what  is  the  reflection  in  this  case  com- 
pared with  it  in  cases  judicial? 

The  objectien,   moreover,  is  theologically  untenable.     Nothing  is 


25 

clearer  in  the  doctrine  of  Christ,  than  that  the  errors  and  sins  of  a  be- 
liever are  constantly  condemned  before  God  and  the  world,  while  to 
the  person  and  standing  of  the  believer  there  is  "  no  condemnation" 
whatever.  This  one  fact  alone  is  conclusive  proof  of  the  incorrectness 
of  the  position  that  the  condemnation  of  error  is  equivalent  to  the 
condemnation  of  its  author.  Were  such  a  position  true,  in  itself,  or 
relatively,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  God  to  condemn  sin,  in  the 
believer,  without  condemning  the  person  of  the  believer  at  the  same 
time.  It  is  bad  theology.  It  is  as  bad  polity.  The  spirit  of  the 
polity  of  Christ  is  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  doctrine  of  Christ, 
and  not  against  it.  It  is  the  grace  of  the  gospel -doctrine  that  inter- 
venes to  protect  the  person  of  the  believer,  while  it  condemns  his  sins. 
It  is  the  same  grace  of  gospel-polity  that  intervenes  to  protect  the 
not  yet  contumacious  person  of  the  teacher,  while  yet  it  condemns 
his  errors.  It  is  lawful,  right,  wise  and  expedient,  to  condemn 
the  error  and  irregularity  of  any  member  of  Presbytery,  without 
arraigning  his  person  in  formal  trial  before  a  judicial  bar. 

Thus,  the  whole  objection  is  uncharitable,  unhistorical,  unscriptural, 
and  rests  upon  prejudices,  assumptions,  sentimentalisms,  importations, 
illogical  inferences,  and  irrelavent  conclusions — all  confronted  by  the 
letter  of  the  constitution,  the  nature  of  the  power  vested  in  the 
Church,  by  apostolic  example,  by  the  precedents  of  our  court,  and  by 
the  doctrine  of  the  Gospel  itself. 

The  fundamental  false  postulate  upon  which  the  whole  objection 
rests,  and  to  which  every  argument  of  the  objecter  returns,  is  the 
denial,  outright,  of  the  authoritative  character  of  episcopal  or  pater- 
nal power,  confining  that  authority  to  judicial  determinations,  a.nd 
restricting  the  idea  of  "discipline"  to  forensic  process.  It  divests 
the  testifying  function  of  the  Church  of  its  whole  authoritative  value, 
reducing  her  witness  for  the  truth  of  Christ,  to  mere  advice,  to  be 
rejected  or  received,  at  will.  It  denies  the  binding  nature  of  that  tes- 
timony. It  makes  it  simply  moral  suasion,  man's  word,  not  God's 
demand.  In  dealing  with  error  everything  not  judicial  is  called  advi- 
sory. It  is  a  compromise  with  Independency — pure  Brownism.  It 
denies  that  the  Church  is  the  steward  of  God  invested  by  Christ,  min- 
isterially, to  rule  the  understanding,  conscience,  and  belief  of  man, 
and  dictate,  according  to  God's  Word,  what  shall  be  maintained  as 
truth  and  what  condemned  as  error,  apart  from  judicial  process.  It 
asserts  that,  save  in  a  case  of  judicial  process,  tlie  authority  of  the 
Church  in  reference  to  error  amounts  to  a  mere  power  of  advice,  in 
other  words,  no  authority  whatever — a  power  binding  none,  but  a  mere 
opinion,  to  be  entertained  or  not,  at  pleasure.     It  lifts  the  voice  of 


26 

remonstrance  against  the  authoritative  exercise  of  the  very  power 
Christ  has  delegated  to  His  Church,  as  an  invasion  of  the  rights  of 
ministers  and  men,  a  power  so  abundantly  illustrated  by  the  Church, 
in  all  ages.  It  exclaims  against  authority  where  forensic  forms  are 
wanting.  It  relegates  public  offenses  against  the  truth  to  the  category 
of  private  ones,  then  challenges  the  right  of  court,  or  minister,  to 
prosecute,  unless  some  private  injury  has  been  received.  It  deems  a 
private  conference  and  explanation,  with  liberty  abundant  still  to 
teach  the  error,  an  ail-sufficient  satisfaction  to  the  Church  and  to  the 
truth.  It  holds  that  admonition  and  injunction  can  never  be  employed 
for  the  arrest  of  error,  till  all  judicial  forms  have  been  exhausted.  Its 
tendency  is  evil.  It  disintegrates,  demoralizes.  It  mars  the  sense  of 
solemn  obligation,  create?  indifference  to  vows,  hostility  to  creeds, 
invites  debates  on  things  forever  settled;  degrades  the  ministry, 
destroys  its  influence,  corrupts  the  Church,  depreciates  the  truth  of 
God,  disputes  the  law  of  Christ,  and  grieves  the  Spirit  of  all  grace.  It 
ends,  at  last,  in  open  insubordination,  and  resistance  to  all  authority, 
judicial  and  episcopal  alike.  History  repeats  itself,  and  wisdom  may 
t-ake  lesson  from  the  past. 

Bat,  Moderator,  in  addition  to  all  I  have  said,  I  would  emphasize 
the  fact,  already  alluded  to,  that  the  whole  episcopal  power  the  Pres- 
bytery possesses  to  condemn  error  in  doctrine  and  practice,  apart  from 
forensic  forms,  so  far  from  being  unconstitutional,  is  grounded  in  that 
«olemii  evangelical  commission  which  Christ,  the  Head  of  the  Church, 
gave  to  His  apostles,  and,  through  them,  to  the  gospel  ministry  for  all 
time.  In  four  passages  of  the  New  Testament  (Matthew  xvi.  19  ; 
Matthew  xviii.  18;  Matthew  xsviii.  19,  20;  John  xx.  21-23),  the 
eharter  for  the  whole  disciplinary  power  of  the  Church  is  contained. 
It  relates,  not  to  extraordinary  and  miraculous  endowment,  peculiar  to 
apostolic  times,  but  to  ordinary  and  perpetual  functions,  durable  to  the 
world's  end.  This  plenary  power,  thus  delegated  by  Christ  to  the 
apostles,  each  minister  possesses  to  its  whole  extent.  Will  any  one  be 
so  foolish  as  to  say  that,  under  such  a  charter,  a  Presbytery,  Synod,  or 
General  Assembly  possesses  less  power,  less  authority,  than  is  given  by 
Christ  to  each  one  of  the  individual  members  composing  it,  or  that 
8uch  power  is  only  to  be  exercised  under  judicial  forms,  for  the  pre- 
servation of  truth  and  the  suppression  of  error  ?  Was  it  forensic  pro- 
cess, think  you,  of  which  the  Saviour  spoke  when  He  lifted  up  His  hands 
on  Olivet  to  bless  His  chosen,  while  His  feet  parted  from  the  mountain 
and  a  cloud  received  Him  out  of  their  sight?  Sir,  it  was  a  gift  of 
episcopal  power  from  the  "chief  Shepherd  and  Bishop"  of  our  souls, 
bequeathed  to  ordained  overseers  of  the  flock,  and  adequate  to  all  the 


27 

necessities  of  the  Church  henceforth  and  for  evermore— an  authorita- 
tive power  of  instruction,  inspection,  and  government,  to  be  executed 
in  His  name.  And  well  did  the  first  princes  in  the  Church  understand 
their  commission.  Were  Simon  IMagus,  or  the  incestuous  Corinthian, 
served  with  an  ecclesiastical  libel,  and  allowed  a  year  and  a  half,  or 
two  years,  of  judicial  process,  through  ascending  appelate  courts,  be- 
fore a  conclusive  sentence  overtook  them?  Were  the  erroneous  opin- 
ions of  Judaising  and  Gnosticising  teachers,  who  ventilated  their  soul- 
subverting  words  and  walked  disorderly,  tabulated  into  formal  accusa- 
tions, witnesses  cited,  cross-examinations  had,  wranglings  perpetuated, 
two  appeals  taken,  and  bitter  parties  formed,  before  the  errors  them- 
selves were  condemned  ?  Did  Paul  sist  Peter  in  a  judicial  process  at 
Antioch  for  his  half  Christian  conduct  and  time-serving  dissimulation? 
Was  Titus  commanded  to  institute  judicial  investigation  against  publi« 
offenders  before  he  dared  to  "admonish"  them,  or  "rebuke  them 
sharply"  and  "before  all,"  that  they  might  be  "sound  in  the  faith?" 
Think  you  the  apostle  reluctated  to  mention  the  names  of  Hymeneus 
and  Philetus,  Alexander  and  Demas,  Hermogenes  and  Phygellus,  or 
note  by  special  designation  the  "unruly  and  vain  talkers  and  deceivers 
of  the  circumcision,  whose  mouths  must  be  stopped,  who  subvert 
whole  houses,  teaching  things  which  they  ought  not,  for  filthy  lucre's 
sake?"  Was  there  any  "  reflection"  here  f  Or  think  you  that  th« 
Lord  Jesus  himself,  in  glory,  deemed  it  "unconstitutional"  and  "out 
af  order"  to  spot  "  that  woman  Jezebel"  in  the  church  at  Thyatria,  or 
name  the  Balaamites  in  Pergamos,  before  a  responsible  prosecutor  had 
stood  up,  or  formal  charges  had  been  preferred  ?  No,  Moderator,  it 
was  an  exercise  of  episcopal  power,  as  I  have  said,  by  the  chief  Shep- 
herd and  Bishop  of  our  souls,  who  walked  unseen  among  the  golden 
candlesticks  and  said,  "  I  know  thy  works." 

The  Thessalonian  Church  was  enjoined  to  "  warn  them  that  are  un- 
ruly." Must  judicial  process  be  commenced  by  the  Presbytery  of 
Thessalonica  ?  The  Corinthian  Church  is  enjoined  "  not  to  company 
with"  the  gross  offenders  named  by  the  apostle.  Must  the  offenses  be 
first  proved  by  judicial  process  against  the  offenders?  The  Ephesian 
Church  is  enjoined  "  to  have  no  fellowship  with  the  umfruitful  works 
of  darkness,  but  rather  reprove  them."  Was  it  that  Presbytery  must 
meet  and  institute  a  judicial  process  before  admonition  or  injunction 
oould  go  forth?  Timothy  and  Titus  are  ordered  to  "rebuke  openly, 
before  all,  them  that  sin,  that  others  may  fear."  Has  a  Presbytery 
less  power  than  Timothy  or  Titus  ?  "A  man  that  is  a  heretic,  after  the 
first  and  second  admonition,  reject."  Did  the  Presbytery  refuse  to  ad- 
monish or  reject  until  after  judicial  process  ?    The  Roman  Church  was 


28 

enjoined  "  to  mark  them  which  cause  divisions  and  offenses,  contrary 
to  the  doctrine"  they  had  learned,  and  "avoid  them."  Was  it  to  be 
done  only  after  j udicial  process?  John  enjoins  the  whole  Church  not 
to  "  receive  into  the  house,"  nor  salute,  a  corrupter  of  the  truth. 
Was  it  an  injunction  to  institute  judicial  process?  The  truth  is  that 
the  administration  of  godly  discipline  for  the  preservation  of  the  truth 
and  morals  of  the  Chui'ch  is  by  episcopal  function,  apart  from  forensic 
forms,  except  in  the  last  resort.  It  is  of  the  same  nature  as  that  of  a 
father  over  his  own  house,  who,  having  learned  to  rule  well  therein, 
"  knows  how  to  take  care  of  the  Church  of  God." 

Who  were  the  "some  among  you"  in  the  Corinthian  Church  who 
denied  the  resurrection  ?  Were  they  not  as  distinctly  marked  by  these 
discriminating  Avordsas  were  the  Cretan  "slow-bellies  and  liars"  them- 
selves ?  What  kind  of  power  was  it  the  Jerusalem  Council  exercised 
under  a  non-judicial  reference  from  Antioch,  against  "certain  men" 
well  known,  who  accounted  circumcision  more  than  Christ  and  His 
cross,  and  preached  without  restraint  their  soul-subverting  doctrine  ? 
Was  it  error  only  "in  the  abstract "  that  council  condemned — error, 
evasive  of  all  allusion  to  its  propagators,  or  its  reported  relation  to  the 
particular  Church  at  Antioch  ?  Was  forensic  process  ordered  to  be  in- 
stituted against  the  Judaizers  or  those  who  had  imbibed  their  false 
teaching  ?  No.  Episcopal  poAver  was  invoked,  the  power  of  the  Je- 
rusalem Presbytery,  as  such,  and  exercised  to  its  oecumenical  extent. 
Error  in  doctrine  and  practice  was  condemned.  The  emissaries  of 
Judaism,  from  their  headquarters  at  Jerusalem,  "false  brethren,  un- 
awares brought  in,  who  came  in  privily  to  spy  out  the  liberty"  of  Gen- 
tile Christians  in  "  Christ  Jesus,  that  they  might  bring  them  into 
bondage,"  were  put  under  the  ban.  The  Churches  in  Antioch,  Syria, 
and  Cilicia  were  all  admonished  and  enjoined,  apart  from  forensic  pro- 
cedure. Verse  24th  of  the  fifteenth  of  Acts  is  a  simple  preamble; 
verse  29th  is  simply  a  resolution  of  injunction. 

If  we  do  but  read  the  Scriptures  carefully,  we  shall  find  that  the 
discipline  of  the  Apostolic  Church  confined  itself  to  admonition  first  of 
all,  solemnly  and  twice  repeated,  before  procedure  to  greater  severities. 
We  shall  next  ^detect  the  more  impressive  warning  that  followed ;  then 
the  sharp  rebuke  and  the  authoritative  injunction  against  both  error  in 
doctrine  and  practice,  by  the  sole  exercise  of  episcopal  power,  vested 
by  Christ  in  His  chosen  ministry,  apart  from  all  judicial  process.  We 
shall  then  learn  that  it  was  contumacy  against  such  admonition,  warn- 
ing, rebuke,  and  injunction,  that  paved  the  way  for  excommunication. 
If  judicial  process  ever  entered  it  was  only  after  all  other  means  had 
been  exhausted.     Surely,  if  in  the  case  of  notorious  error,  like  that  of 


29 

Simon  Magus,  or  notorious  practice,  like  that  of  the  "incestuous" 
man  of  Corinth,  the  notoriety  of  the  fact,  or  what  was  '-commonly 
reported  "  and  known  to  all  as  true,  made  the  offender,  i})SO  facto,  liable 
to  excommunication,  what  folly  it  is  to  deny  the  Church's  right  of 
mere  admonition  and  injunction  when  common  fame  and  documentary 
evidence  in  court,  bright  as  daylight,  make  the  case- beyond  dispute! 

The  history  of  the  sub-Apostolic  Church,  long  before  the  existence 
of  Theodosian  and  Justinian  codes  with  civil  penalties  for  error,  only 
confirms  the  interpretation  I  have  given  of  the  exercise  of  episcopal 
power.  Errors  in  doctrine  and  practice  were  condemned,  uniformly, 
before  extreme  process  was  instituted  against  their  authors.  "  The 
directions,"  says  Bingham  (Antiquities,  II,  p.  891),  "were  drawn  up 
upon  the  models  of  those  rules  of  the  Apostles  which  forbade  Christians 
to  give  any  countenance  to  notorious  offenders."  "  Errorists  are  they 
who,  when  they  are  reproved  for  their  unsound  opinions,  contuma- 
ciously resist"  (II,  981).  The  offenders  were  named,  their  errors  con- 
demned, and  the  Churches  were  warned  and  enjoined  as  well  as  the 
offender  himself,  who  was  admonished  or  rebuked.  It  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  framed  upon  the  Apostolic  model,  in  all 
times  and  countries,  and  signal  examples  of  which  are  found  in  all  her 
history.  "It  thus  appears,"  says  Sir  Henry  Wellwood  Moncrief,  con- 
vener of  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Free  Church  of  Scotland,  "  that 
the  Free  Church,  by  retaining  the  old  form  of  process  as  part  of  her 
law,  would  restrain  a  Presbytery  from  instituting  or  entertaining  a  regular 
process  against  any  minister  until  all  means  have  been  exhausted  for  pre- 
venting the  necessity  of  such  a  process  being  entered  on."  (Practice  of  the 
Free  Church,  Edinburg,  1871,  p.  118.)  It  is  the  assertion  of  episcopal 
power  as  lodged  in  the  Presbytery,  and  precisely  to  the  same  end  is 
the  comment  of  Stewart  of  Pardovan,  the  Blackstone  of  the  Presby- 
terian Church,  in  his  "  Methodised  Observations"  upon  the  clause  in 
our  Form  of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8,  giving  power  to  the 
Presbytery  to  "condemn  erroneous  opinions  which  injure  the  purity 
or  peace  of  the  Church" — upon  which  he  says  that  the  Presbytery  has 
not  only  the  power  of  '^  censuring  ministers"  of  "rebuking  gross  or  con- 
tumacious sinners,"  but  also  the  power  "of  answering  of  questions,  cases 
of  conscience,  solving  of  difficulties  in  doctrine  or  discipline,  with  peti- 
tions from  their  own  or  those  in  other  Presbyteries,  examining  and 
censuring  according  to  the  Word  of  God  any  erroneous  doctrine  which  hath 
been  pid)licly  or  more  privately  vented  within  their  bounds,  and  the 
endeavoring,  the  reducing,  and  conversion  of  any  that  remain  in  error 
and  schism."     (Obser.  Method.,  Book  I,  Title  XII,  Section  4.) 

How  different  from   our  practice,  that    would  do  nothing  except 


30 

resort  to  judicial  process  in  the  very  start!  Deprive  the  Church 
of  Christ  of  her  right  to  bear  testimony  against  and  condemn  error 
..in  doctrine  and  practice,  vented  in  her  own  bosom,  apart  from  judicial 
process,  to  admonish,  warn,  reprove,  rebuke,  enjoin  ;  deny  to  Presby- 
tery this  right,  a  right  accorde  I  to  every  pastor  and  elder  by  the  Word 
of  (rod,  and  enforced  in  every  Apastolic  letter,  and  the  mission  of  the 
Church,  as  a  witness  for  the  Truth,  its  pillar,  ground,  and  guardian,  is 
concluded  forever.  With  this,  tlierefore,  I  close  the  discussion  of  the 
first  reason  to  the  first  point  of  my  Complaint,  by  affirming  that  the 
action  of  the  Presbytery  of  Cincinnati  was  a  repudiation  of  the  right 
vested  in  it  by  the  Head  of  the  Church,  to  condemn  erroneous  opinions 
which  injure  its  peace  and  purity,  a  right  guaranteed  by  the  constitu- 
tion itself  and  protected  by  parliamentary  rule. 

(2.)  The  second  reason  in  support  of  my  first  point  of  Complaint  is, 
that  the  action  of  Presbytery,  sustaining  the  decision  of  the  Moderator 
(see  first  point  of  Complaint),  was  "a  violation  of  parliamentary  rule,  in 
derogation  of  my  constitutional  right  to  introduce  my  Preamble  and  Reso- 
lutions, and  to  discuss  the  merits  of  the  same  after  they  were  seconded, 
and  I  was  entitled  to  the  floor,  no  matter  what  the  result  might  have 
been  on  the  final  vote,  after  discussion." 

I  claim.  Moderator,  that,  when  I  was  interrupted  on  the  floor  of 
the  Presbytery  by  Dr.  Morris,  who  rose  to  a  "  point  of  order,"  assert- 
ing that  my  Preamble  and  Resolutions  were  unconstitutional,  and, 
therefore,  that  even  the  "  consideration"  of  them  was  not  to  be  enter- 
tained, and  when  the  Moderator  of  the  Presbytery  decided  that  the 
point  was  ^^  well  taken,"  and  the  Presbytery  sustained,  on  appeal,  this 
decision,  I  was  perfectly  "  in  order."  The  rules  in  order  in  both 
houses  of  Congress,  in  our  State  Legislatures,  and  in  deliberative 
bodies  in  general,  are  derived  from  the  British  Parliament,  and  modi- 
fied to  suit  our  various  circumstances.  The  rules  of  order  for  our 
Church  judicatories  have  the  same  origin.  We  have  thus  acquired  a 
system  of  parliamentary  regulations,  prescribing  and  defining  a  cer- 
tain fixed  mode  of  procedure  in  the  course  of  deliberative  business. 
Our  general  rules  of  order,  which  form  no  part  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  Presbyterian  Church,  as  the  Constitution  of  the  Presbyterian 
Church  forms  no  part  of  them,  are  inscribed  in  our  Digest,  pp.  204  to 
208,  and  are  forty -three  in  number.  As  to  the  order  prescribed  in 
"judicial  process,"  I  do  not  hear  speak.  It  belongs  to  the  pi'ocess 
itself,  Presbytery  acting  as  a  court,  and  not  as  a  deliberative  and  parlia- 
mentary body.  According  to  Rule  of  Order  XIV,  whenever  a  motion  is 
made,  seconded,  written,  and  read  aloud,  and  the  mover  addresses  the 
Moderator  (Rule  XXXI),  being  entitled  to  the  floor,  he  conforms  to 


31 

the  rules  of  order  laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  our  courts.  My  Pre- 
amble and  Resolution  were  in  writing;  they  were  duly  seconded  ;  no 
other  business  was  before  tlie  house,  and  I  was  entitled  tor  the  floor  by 
the  Moderator's  decision,  none  disputing  it;  I  addressed  the  chair;  I 
was  respectful  to  my  brethren.  The  Investigating  Committee  had  re- 
ported, and  the  official  documents  necessary  to  sustain  my  Preamble 
and  Resolutions  were  upon  the  table,  subject  to  the  call  of  myself  or 
any  member  of  the  body.  I  had  not  only  a  constitutional  right  to 
introduce  a  Preamble  and  Resolutions,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
disapprove  erroneous  opinions  already  disapproved  of  by  the  Com- 
mittee itself,  but  also  a  parliamentary  right  to  debate  the  Preamble 
and  Resolutions  themselves  upon  tfieir  merits.  There  are  two  classes 
of  motions,  both  of  which  are  in  order,  but  only  one  of  which  is  in 
order  to  be  discussed  upon  their  merits;  in  other  words,  there  are 
motions  ciebateable  and  it/idebateable.  In  conformity  with  all  parlia- 
mentary manuals,  our  rules  of  order  specify  both.  (See  Rule  XVIII.) 
The  motions  w/idebatable  on  their  merits  are:  "  to  lay  on  the  table," 
"  to  take  up  business,"  "  to  adjourn,"  and  "  the  call  for  the  previous 
question."  All  other  motions,  without  exception,  nre  debateable  on  their 
merits.  No  power  can  deprive  a  man  of  his  right  to  debate  a  debate- 
able  motion.  My  Preamble  and  Resolutions,  therefore,  were  not  only 
"in  order,"  according  to  our  rules,  but  debateable  on  their  merits  by 
the  same  rules  ;  and  this  is  a  universal  rule.  (See  the  Manuals  of  Jef- 
ferson, Cushing,  Roberts,  and  Warrington,  on  "Motions.")  I  was  "  in 
order."  I  had  violated  no  parliamentary  rule  of  procedure  in  busi- 
ness. The  action  of  the  Presbytery,  sustaining  the  Moderator  and 
declaring  me  "  out  of  order,"  was,  therefore,  itself,  a  violation  of  par- 
liamentary rule  in  derogation  of  my  constitutional  rights  of  free  dis- 
cussion on  the  merits  of  the  case  before  us.  It  was  abundantly  com- 
petent for  the  Presbytery,  after  I  had  been  heard,  to  make  their 
assumed  unconstitutionality  of  my  motion  their  reason,  if  they  saw 
fit,  for  voting  down  my  motion,  and  putting  my  Preamble  and  Reso- 
lutions out  of  the  house.  But,  1  submit  that  such  assumed  unconsti- 
tutionality was  no  reason  whatsoever  why,  when  perfectly  "  in  or- 
der," I  should  have  been  pronounced  "  out  of  order,"  as  at  a  previous 
Presbytery,  and  thus  twice  be  denied  both  ray  constitutional  and  par- 
liamentary rights  to  debate  the  merits  of  my  motion.  I  shall  return 
to  this  again.     1  was  perfectly  "  in  order." 

(3.)  The  third  reason  in  support  of  ray  first  point  of  Coraplaint  (see 
fii'st  point  of  Complaint)  was,  that  "said  decision  of  the  Moderator, 
.sustained  and  sanctioned  by  the  Presbytery,  was  an  exercise  of  the 
most  responsible  prerogative  reserved  to  the  General  Assembly,  viz. : 


32 

that  of  deciding  questions  of  constitutional  law  and  binding  its  interpretation 
on  the  court  as  a  rule  of  action."  Individual  Presbyteries  or  Synods 
have  no  right  to  bind  their  interpretations  of  constitutional  law  as  a 
rule  of  action  on  the  court,  much  less,  where  Ihe  supreme  court  itself 
has,  after  a  sharp  contest,  announced  a  definitive  decision,  and  appli- 
cable precisely  to  such  cases  as  the  one  referred  to  in  my  Preamble 
and  Resolutions.  It  matters  not,  that  a  person,  charged  with  teaching 
erroneous  opinions,  denies  the  opinions  charged,  or  even  his  own  writ- 
ten language.  This  is  no  bar  to  deliberation.  "  Allegans  contraria 
non  est  audiendus."  It  rather  concludes  the  case  against  him.  A 
man  may  multiply  denials  and  self-contradictions  perpetually.  This 
may  be  a  reason  why  preamble  and  resolutions  should  not  be 
adopted,  upon  a  final  vote,  but  it  is  no  reason  why  they  should 
be  declared  as  "  out  of  order,"  nor  is  it  any  reason  in  support  of 
the  Presbytery's  assumption  of  the  Assembly's  prerogative  to  decide 
constitutional  law  and  bind  it  as  a  rule  of  action  on  the  court.  Again, 
I  appeal  to  the  acknowledged  maxim  of  law,  "  Ejus  est  interpretari,  cujius 
est  condere," — it  belongs  to  that  power  to  interpret  the  law,  whose  ofiice 
it  is  to  settle  and  establish  it.  To  the  General  Assembly,  therefore, 
composed  of  the  representatives  of  Presbyteries,  or  in  other  words,  to 
Presbyteries  in  Assembly  by  means  of  their  representations,  but  not 
to  Presbyteries  individually,  pertains  this  high  prerogative.  Other- 
wise, our  Church  would  become  a  very  Babel  of  multiplied  and  con- 
tradictory decisions  upon  questions  of  constitutional  law,  confusion  worse 
confounded.  The  interpretation  of  the  Assembly  is  binding  law,  and 
not  the  interpretation  of  the  individual  Presbytery. 

The  Presbytery's  action  assumed  to  interpret  the  clause  in  our  Form 
of  Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8,  "to  condemn  erroneous  opin- 
ions," etc.,  as  meaning,  that  no  court  can  condemn  such  opinions 
except  by  judicial  arraignment  of  their  author.  But  this  exception  is 
an  interpolation  of  the  constitution.  It  is  an  addition,  an  unauthor- 
ized gloss,  not  only  in  the  face  of  a  previous  and  discriminating  clause 
as  to  "judging  ministers,"  a  clause  involving  both  the  person  and  the 
judicial  process  together,  but  directly  in  face  of  contrary  and  binding 
decisions  of  our  supreme  court  itself.  Where  does  the  constitution 
say.  Moderator,  that  Presbyteries  have  no  power  to  condemn  errone- 
ous opinions,  except  by  the  modal  limitation  of  judicial  process  ?  No- 
where. That  limitation  defeats  "  the  plain  intent  of  the  law,"  and  is 
a  mere  obiter  dictum,  without  the  least  authority.  Not  less  unauthor- 
ized is  the  assertion  that  "  the  exercise  of  episcopal  power  is  a  usurpa- 
tion of  the  judicial  without  submitting  to  its  limitations."  This  is  to 
deny  both   the   letter  of  the   constitution  and  the  decisions  of  our 


33 

supreme  court.  Judicial  process  is  always  the  last  resort  and  not  the 
fii'st.  The  Presbytery  had  uo  right  to  put  its  interpretation  upon  the 
constitution  in  face  of  the  Assembly's  interpretation  of  our  law,  ah-eady 
given. 

And  this  was  the  doctrine  of  the  very  Assembly  of  1834  itself.  In 
the  most  express  terms  that  Assembly  affirmed,  that  to  the  General 
Assembly  alone  it  belongs  to  interpret  the  constitution.  It  said  these 
words,  "  the  Form  of  Government  vests  the  right  of  deciding  questions 
of  constitutional  law,  not  in  Synods,  but  in  the  General  Assembly." 
Moore's  Digest,  p.  263  (3).  According  to  this  announcement,  no  in- 
ferior court  and  no  moderator  may  assume  this  prerogative  and  bind  a 
new  interpretation  on  the  court  as  a  rule  of  action.  The  thing  to  be 
specially  remarked,  just  here,  is  this,  that  the  very  Assembly  of  1834, 
which  gave  a  wrong  interpretation  of  the  clause,  "  to  condemn  errone- 
ous opinions  which  injure  the  peace  and  purity  of  the  Church,"  by 
construing  said  clause  with  an  unauthorized  limitation,  was  the  very 
Assembly  which  yet  maintained  that  the  Supreme  court  alone  is  compe- 
tent to  interpret  the  constitution  and  bind  that  interpretation  as  a  rule 
of  action  on  all  our  courts. 

Precisely  the  same  doctrine  was  reaffirmed  by  the  Old  School  Gen- 
eral Assembly  of  1844,  six  years  after  the  division.  It  said  these 
words:  "What  interest  has  the  Synod  more  than  other  Synods  or 
Presbyteries  in  giving  a  wrong  exposition  of  our  book.  When  we  in- 
terpret our  constitution,  the  voice  of  the  whole  Church  should  be  heard." 
(Moore's  Digest,  p.  598  (3).  Thus,  both  the  Old  School  and  the  New 
School  brethren  agreed  in  this,  that  the  prerogative  of  interpreting 
our  constitution  and  binding  the  interpretation  upon  all  the  courts,  as  a 
rule  of  action,  belongs  to  the  General  Assembly  alone.  And  all  the  more 
is  this  evident  as  we  learn,  from  our  supreme  decisions,  that  no  com- 
plaint will  lie,  in  any  case,  against  a  court  for  declining  to  usurp  this 
function  of  the  Assembly  (Moore's  Digest,  p.  598  (4),  but  that  it  will 
lie  against  the  exercise  of  this  function.  (Moore's  Digest,  p.  593  (4). 
Thus,  the  general  law  maxim,  "  Ejus  est  interpretari  cujus  est  conderej' 
the  constitution  itself,  in  its  literal,  rational  and  historical  construction, 
brethren  of  both  Old  and  New  School  alike,  with  the  binding  de- 
cisions of  our  Digest  and  its  historical  precedents,  all  show  that  the 
Cincinnati  Presbytery,  in  the  action  I  complain  of,  usurped  the  high 
prerogative  of  the  General  Assembly. 

(4.)  The  fourth  reason  in  support  of  my  first  point  of  Complaint  is 
(see  first  point  of  Complaint),  "  that  the  action  of  Presbytery  was  tlie 
turning  of  a  constitutional  question  into  a  parliamentary  rule  of  order,  so 
inventing  a  new  rule  in  derogation  of  my  constitutional  and  parlia- 
mentary rights." 


34 

Moderator,  Avhat  do  we  mean  when  we  use  the  expressions  "  law" 
and  "order?"  Is  each  one  pleonastic  of  the  other?  Or,  is  there  a 
well-defined  and  settled  distinction  between  them  ?  True,  in  a  general 
and  wide  sense,  law  is  a  rule  of  action.  But  when  we  use  it  in  the 
expression,  "  law  and  order,"  what  is  it  we  mean  by  law,  and  what  by 
order,  each  as  distinguished  from  the  other,  in  deliberative  bodies? 
The  conceptions  are  totall}^ different.  By  "  law"  we  mean,  our  consti- 
tution, an  organic  statute,  or  a  decision  of  the  supreme  court.  Our 
Confession  of  Faith,  Form  of  Government,  Book  of  Discipline,  Cate- 
chisms, Directory  of  Worship,  and  the  decisions  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, are  what  we  call  '■'law."  By  "order"  we  mean,  conformity  to  a 
j)rescribed  mode  of  procedure  in  business  in  a  deliberative  body,  and 
nothing  more.  When  we  say  laiv,  the  mind  goes  straight  to  the  con- 
stitution and  its  authorized  interpretation.  When  we  say  order,  the 
mind  goes  straight  to  parllamentery  rules  of  procedure  in  business. 
The  termini  of  the  two  conceptions,  and  the  contents  of  the  two,  are 
totally  different.  The  one  relates  wholly  to  the  constitution  and  its 
interpretation,  the  other  relates  wholly  to  the  general  rules  of  our  judi- 
catories for  procedure  in  business — it  relates  to  "proceedings" — and 
such  is  the  definition  of  lexicographers  and  parliamentarians.  Mr. 
Webster's  definition  of  "order"  is  as  follows:  "Adherence  to  the 
point  in  discussion  according  to  established  rules  of  debate ;  as  the 
member  is  not  in  order,  i.  e.,  he  wanders  from  the  question."  "  Estab- 
lished mode  of  proceeding ; — the  motion  is  not  in  order."  "  Regular- 
ity;  settled  mode  of  operation."  The  definition  in  Jefferson's  Manual 
is  as  follows :  "  Order  in  conformity  with  the  ndes  of  order  laid  down. 
Departure  from  the  rules,  is  a  breach  of  oi'der."  In  that  majestic  vol- 
ume of  a  thousand  pages  by  Mr.  Gushing,  on  the  "  Law  and  Practice 
of  Legislative  Assemblies,"  founded  on  Hatsell's  celebrated  precedents, 
we  have  the  following  clear  and  unambiguous  words:  "All  questions 
of  order  are  determined  by  reference  to  the  rules  of  order.  Any  mem- 
ber, rightfully  in  possession  of  the  house,  his  motion  having  been  sec- 
onded, is  in  order."  "And  it  is  the  right  of  members  to  originate 
propositions,  at  their  pleasure,  for  the  consideration  of  the  house ;  and 
any  member,  in  possession  of  the  house,  may  make  any  motion  he 
thinks  proper." 

Now,  Moderator,  where  in  all  our  rules  of  order  is  the  interpretation 
of  the  constitution  according  to  the  Assembly  of  1834  to  be  found? 
Where  is  our  constitution  found  in  the  rules  of  order?  Where  are  any 
of  the  decisions  of  any  of  our  General  Assemblies  found  in  the  rules 
of  order?  And  by  what  right  did  the  Presbytery  of  Cincinnati  make 
its  interpretation  of  the  constitution  a  rule  of  order,  and,  upon   that 


35 

ground,  rule  my  Preamble  and  Resolutions  as  "out  of  order f"  The 
thing  is  too  evident  to  require  discussion.  Nothing  is  a  "point  of  order" 
hi  parliamentary  debate  which  does  not  relate  to  accepted  rides  of  order  pre- 
scribed for  procedure  in  business.  1  was  perfectly  in  order,  according  to 
the  rules  of  our  court,  as  I  have  already  shown.  I  violated  no  parlia- 
mentary regulation,  either  at  Glendale  or  at  Cincinnati.  My  paper 
was  before  the  house,  written  and  seconded,  no  other  business  being 
before  the  body,  and  was  just  as  much  in  order  as  the  papers  of  Br. 
Morris  or  those  of  Messrs.  Ritchie,  Hills,  and  Stauton.  A  man  is  in 
order,  if  he  conforms  to  the  parliamentary  rules  of  procedure  in  busi- 
ness. He  may  be  perfectly  in  order,  while  his  motion  may  be  per- 
fectly unconstitutional,  and  his  motion  may  be  perfectly  constitutional, 
while  he  himself  is  as  perfectly  "out  of  order."  Therefore  it  was  a 
usurpation  of  my  rights,  when  a  question  of  constitutional  law  was 
turned  into  a  "  point  of  order,"  entertained  by  the  Moderator,  and 
sustained  by  the  Presbytery,  so  taking  from  me,  both  ray  constitu- 
tional and  parliamentary  rights  to  discuss  my  Preamble  and  Resolu- 
tions on  their  merits,  and  to  adduce  in  their  support  the  "facts" 
which  had  been  introduced  into  the  house  by  the  official  report  of  its 
own  committee. 

But  it  has  been  said,  there  are  such  things  as  "constitutional  rules," 
and  we  have  a  right,  therefore,  to  turn  questions  of  constitutional  law 
into  "rules  of  order."  The  logic  of  this  reasoning  is  as  fallacious  as 
the  intuition  of  the  fiicts  is  obscure.  No  calculus,  known  to  mathe- 
matics to-day,  is  able  to  fix  the  amount  of  power  necessary  to  draw 
such  an  enormous  conclusion,  and  no  logical  harness,  yet  made,  is 
strong  enough  to  endure  the  strain.  For,  "  constitutional  rules  " 
relate  to  polity,  and  are  parts  of  the  constitution  itself.  They  are 
actual  amendments  to,  or  interpretations  of,  the  Articles  of  Govern- 
ment and  Discipline,  in  every  case,  however,  "  exckiding  alteration 
of  the  doctrine  and  fundamental  principles  of  the  Church."  (Moore's 
Digest,  p.  328.)  Proposed  to  all  the  Presbyteries  and  adopted,  upon 
overture,  by  two  thirds  of  them,  they  are  then,  formally,  declared  by 
the  Assembly  to  be  laic,  and  are  irrepealable,  henceforth,  by  the  As- 
sembly itself  or  by  any  subordinate  court.  They  are  legislative  acts 
of  the  whole  Church.  Presbytery  can  not  make  them,  nor  unmake 
them  ;  neither  can  Assembly.  As  part  of  the  constitution,  they 
have  the  whole  force  of  constitutional  law.  These  rules  are  of  the 
nature  of  judicial  order  of  proceeding  definitely  defined,  which,  though 
not  parliamentary  rules  of  order,  are  defined  order  itself.  Clearly,  a 
motion  against  any  of  these  could  not  be  entertained,  for  here  law  and 
order  are  made  identical.     Where  the  constitution  itself,  as  in  judicial 


36 

process,  assumes  the  feature  of  a  mandate,  an  express  "shall,"  it  is 
then  settled  order  itself,  and  no  motion  can  be  entertained  against  it, 
making  it  out  of  order.  The  ground  of  refusal  to  entertain  such  mo- 
tion, is  not  that  the  motion  is  unconstitutional,  however  true  that  may 
be,  but  that  it  is  against  order  itself,  and  no  motion  is  in  order  that  is 
out  of  order. 

Nor  are  our  Rules  of  Order  part  of  our  Constitution.  In  express 
terms  our  Digest  says:  "The  following  rules,  not  having  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  Presbyteries,  make  no  part  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Pres- 
byterian Church."  (Moore's  Digest,  p.  204.)  And  even  if  they  did,  yet, 
such  a  rule  as  the  one  the  Cincinnati  Presbytery  has  legislated  into 
existence,  on  the  basis  of  1834,  has  no  place  in  the  catalogue.  But 
now,  we  have  been  suddenly  presented  with  a  new  rule  of  procedure, 
we  may  call  it  Rule  XLIV,  added  to  the  list,  and  it  will  read  this  way  : 
"iVb  Presbytery  shall  consider  any  motion,  preamble  or  resolution,  condemnhig 
erroneous  opinions  under  its  jurisdiction  which  injure  the  peace  and  purity  of 
the  Church,  unless  after  judicial  process  of  the  author  of  said  opiiiionsy  The 
odor  of  it.  Moderator,  savors  very  much  of  an  attack  upon  the  consti- 
tution indeed,  but  then,  you  know,  it  is  only  a  "rnZe  of  order  V  I 
admit.  Moderator,  that  under  such  an  enactment,  my  Preamble  and 
Resolutions  would  have  been  out  of  order,  but  I  deny  that  the  Assem- 
bly has  made  such  an  enactment,  or  bound  such  a  rule  upon  the  court. 
Where  is  such  a  rule  to  be  found,  even  in  our  constitutional  rules  ? 
Where  is  the  Presbytery's  right  to  turn  a  question  of  constitutional 
law,  in  face  of  the  binding  decision  of  the  Assembly,  into  a  rule  of 
order?  It  is  pure  legislation,  an  assumption,  by  Presbytery,  of  the 
function  of  the  General  Assembly ;  a  violation  of  the  dearest  and 
most  sacred  rights  of  motion  and  discussion,  guaranteed  to  every 
Presbytery  by  the  constitution  of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  and  by 
parliamentary  rule.  How  often  must  it  be  repeated  before  we  under- 
stand it,  that  nothing  is  a  "point  of  order''  which  does  not  relate  to 
established  rules  of  order  prescribed  for  procedure  in  business. 

But  now.  Moderator,  granting  that  all  I  have  said  goes  for  nothing; 
admit,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  the  unconstitutionality  of  my  Pre- 
amble and  Resolutions  ;  allow  that  the  Presbytery's  construction  of  the 
constitution  was  right,  as  against  the  binding  decisions  of  the  General 
Assembly  ;  grant  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  non-judicial  power  to 
condemn  error ;  grant  everything  that  the  brethren  opposed  to  my  motion 
maintained,  or  might  maintain,  I  still  deny  that  a  man  is  "  out  of  order" 
simply  because  his  motion  or  preamble  and  resolutions  either  are,  or 
assumed  to  be,  "unconstitutional.''  You  may  lay  them  ou  the  table, 
or  vote  them  down,  after  they  have  been  moved,  seconded  and  dis- 


37 

cussed,  even  though  they  declare  that  the  constitution  itself  is  uncon- 
stitutional. But  the  mover  is  "  in  order,"  and  has  both  a  constitutional 
and  a  parliamentary  right  to  be  heard  on  their  merits. 

In  support  of  this  position  I  adduce  the  testimony  of  several  gen- 
tlemen of  eminent  authority  in  parliamentary  experience.  The  first 
I  mention  is  the  Hon.  J.  F.  Foliett,  late  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  the  State  of  Ohio. 

Cincinnati,  O.,  October  9,  1876. 
Hon.  J.  F.  Follett: 

Dear  Sir — The  constitution  of  the  Presbyterian  Church,  Form  of 
Government,  Chapter  X,  Section  8,  gives  a  Presbytery  the  "power  to 
condemn  erroneons  opinions  that  injure  the  peace  and  purity  of  the 
Church.     Suppose  I  offer  the  following  : 

"  Whereas,  A.  B.  has  taught  and  teaches  so  and  so,  which  is 
"erroneous''  (here  I  quote  the  proofs  of  error  in  language  of  the 
author),  therefore, 

"  Resolved,  i'hat  A.  B.  is  in  error  in  said  opinions,  and  is  hereby  en- 
joined not  to  propagate  them. 

I.  Is  this  preamble  and  resolution  "out  of  order"  if  it  is  duly 
moved,  seconded,  and  the  mover  has  the  floor,  and  there  is  no  other 
business  before  the  house  ? 

II.  Suppose  some  one  rises  to  what  he  chooses  to  call  a  "point  of  order, ^' 
viz.:  That  according  to  his  interpretation  of  the  constitution,  the  above 
clause  excludes  the  condemnation  of  error,  except  in  the  abstract,  and 
that  forty  General  Assemblies  have  so  decided,  and  therefore  it  is 
"out  of  order"  even  to  "consider"  the  preamble  and  resolution,  is  the 
the  mover  "out  of  order"  on  that  account? 

Is  any  interpretation  of  the  constitution,  pro  or  eon,  to  be  made  a 
parliamentary  rule  for  procedure  in  business?  Admit  that  the  Pre- 
amble and  Resolution  are  against  the  constitution  itself,  most  clearly, 
does  that  make  their  mover  "  out  of  order,"  and  close  his  mouth  on  the 
merits  of  the  case  ? 

Suppose  a  member  of  the  legislature  moves  to  burn  up  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  or  to  secede  from  the  Union,  and  the  motion  is 
seconded,  and  the  mover  has  a  riglit  to  the  floor,  is  he  "out  of  order" 
because  he  is  unconstitutional?  Is  he  not  entitled  to  speak  to  the  full 
merits  of  the  case,  even  though  the  house  will  vote  down  his  i-esolutions 
instantly  ? 

I  hold  that  the  "constitution  "  is  one  thing  and  "order"  is  another. 
Order  in  a  deliberative  body,  is  conformity  to  a  prescribed  mode  of 
procedure  in  business  and  relates  wholly  to  parliamentary  rule,  while 


38 

constitution  or  organic  law  is  a  wholly  different  thing,  and  no  inter- 
pretation of  it  may  ba  made  a  parliamentary  rule  under  which  to 
declare  a  resolution  opposed  to  that  interpretation  as  "  out  of  order,'' 
if  it  is  duly  seconded  and  the  member  has  a  right  to  the  floor  and  no 
other  business  is  before  the  house?  Please  inform  me,  is  my  view 
right  or  wrong  ? 

Truly  yours,  etc.,  etc., 

ii?  ^  :^  * 

"  I  have  iw  hesitation  in  saying  your  vieio  is  right, 

John  F.  Follett." 

1,  Does  the  unconstitutionality  of  a  motion  or  preamble  and  resolu- 
tion make  said  motion  or  preamble  and  resolution,  ipso  facto,  "out 
of  order  f" 

"  It  does  not. 

J.    F.    FOLLEIT." 

2.  Is  an  unconstitutional  motion,  preamble  or  resolution,  if  duly 
seconded,  no  other  business  being  before  the  house,  "in  order,"  and 
debateable  on  its  merits? 

•''  It  is.  Very  truly,  / 

J.  F.  Follett." 

I  also  add  the  following  answer  from  my  respected  friend,  Hon. 
Kufus  King,  President  of  the  late  convention  of  the  State  of  Ohio, 
assembled  for  the  revision  of  its  Constitution ; — an  answer  written  to  the 
same  communication  addressed  to  the  Hon.  Mr.  Follett : 

"  Cincinnati,  O.,  October  8,  1876. 

"  My  Deak  Ser — Unless  precluded  by  some  special  rule  of  order,  the 
Presbytery  was  bound  to  entertain  such  a  motion  as  yours.  I  do  not 
see  how  it  can  even  be  questioned.  Nothing  which  has  relation  to  the 
laws,  powers,  or  duties  of  the  body,  can  be  out  of  order,  if  not  expressly 
forbidden  by  the  rules  of  order. 

Yours  very  truly, 

RuFus  King." 

I  add  also  the  following  correspondence  had  with  the  Hon.  Schuyler 
Colfax,  formerly  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  Presi- 
dent of  the  Senate,  of  the  United  States : 

Cincinnati,  O.,  November  1,  1876. 
Hon,  Schuyler  Colfax  : 

Dear  Sir — Allow  me  to  ask  your  decision,  as  a  parliamentarian, 
upon  the  following  questions :  1.  Is  it  the  province  of  a  presiding 
officer,  or  of  any  deliberative  body,  acting  under  written  parliamentary 


39 

"  Rules  of  Order,"  to  make  this  or  that  assumed  or  real  interpretation 
of  the  Constitution  a  "point  of  order,"  or  a  "rule  of  order,"  when 
said  interpretation  is  no  part  of  tlie  "  Rules  of  Order?"  2.  Does  the 
unconstitutionality  of  a  proposition  make  it,  ipso  facto,  "out  of  order?" 
3.  Is  any  motion,  Preamble,  or  Resolution,  even  if  unconstitutional, 
debateable  on  its  merits,  if  duly  offered  and  seconded,  and  not  excluded 
by  the  specified  class  of  " undebateable  motions"  known  as  such  to 
parliamentarians?     Please  be  so  kind  as  to  give  me  your  opinion. 

Very  truly  yours,  etc.,  etc., 

>|;  j[;  ijc  >K 

"  South  Bend,  Ind  ,  November  7,  1876. 
"Dear  Sib — Your  letter  has  just  reached  me.  In  Congress,  the 
presiding  officers  do  not  rule  out  questions  on  any  grounds  of  uncon- 
stitutionality. This  practice  is  supposed  to  be  the  true  inference  from 
the  British  rule  laid  down  in  Jefferson's  Manual,  Sec.  35.  "  If  an  amend- 
ment be  proposed  inconsistent  with  one  already  agreed  to,  it  is  fit  ground 
for  its  rejection  by  tlie  House;  but  it  is  not  within  the  competence 
of  the  speaker  to  suppress  it,  as  if  it  were  against  order ;  for  were 
he  permitted  to  draw  questions  of  consistence  within  the  vortex  of  order, 
he  might  usurp  a  negative  on  important  modifications  and  suppress 
instead  of  subserve  the  legislative  will." 

Respectfully  yours, 

Schuyler  Colfax."' 

I  ako  add  the  following  correspondence  with  the  Hon.  Edward  McPher- 
son,  for  many  years  Clerk  of  the  National  House  of  Representatives 
and  a  universal  authority  on  parliamentary  law  and  precedent  through- 
out the  country. 

Cincinnati,  O.,  October  9,  1876. 
Hon.  Edward  McPherson: 

Dear  Sir — Our  Form  of  Government,  Chap.  X,  Sec.  8,  with  which 
you  are  well  acquainted,  gives  Presbytery  the  "power,"  among  other 
things,  "  to  condemn  erroneous  opinions  which  injure  the  purity  or 
peace  of  the  Church."  This  is  a  function  of  Episcopal  power,  as  I 
take  it,  discriminated  from  the  function  of  Judicial  power,  which  is 
involved  in  the  previous  clause,  viz.,  of  "judging  ministers."  My 
question  is  this,  would  a  Preamble  or,  in  other  words,  a  proposition, 
introduced  into  Presbytery,  reciting  erroneous  doctrines  or  views 
propagated  by  any  of  its  ministers,  with  the  necessary  proofs  therefor, 
taken  from  ofiicial  documents  on  the  table,  or  otherwise,  and  an 
ajipended  Resolution  condemning  the  error  and  enjoining  its  new 
propagation,  be  "out  of  order"  or  "unconstitutional?"  And' would 
an  amendment,  unconstitutional  in  itself,  be  "out  of  order"  on  that 
ground?  To  what  extent  does  the  jurisdiction  of  a  parliamentary 
officer  go  ?  May  any  proposition  or  motion  duly  made  and  seconded 
be  debated  on  its  merits,  if  within  the  rules  as  to  debateable  motions? 
A  brief  answer  to  these  interrogations  will  place  me  under  obligations 
to  your  kindness. 

Very  sincerely  yours,  etc., 


40 

"Gettysburg,  Pa.,  Nov.  10,  1876. 
"  Dear  Sir — I  have  been  from  home  for  several  weeks  and  your 
letter  of  the  9th  October  did  not  reach  me  till  after  the  19th. 

"Please  excuse  the  delay  of  this  reply.  I  believe  I  understand 
yotfr  point. 

"As  to  the  amendment.  An  amendment  to  a  pending  proposition, 
germane  to  it,  is  in  order,  without  any  regard  to  the  alleged  unconsti- 
tutionality. A  presiding  officer  never  undertakes  to  pass  upon  the 
effect  of  an  amendment.  His  jurisdiction  is  wholly  confined  to  the  par- 
liamentery  questions  of  germaneness,  degree,  etc. 

"As  to  the  proposition.     Any  proposition  duly  offered  and  properly 
pending  is  subject  to  debate  upon  its  merits,  within  the  rules,  as  well 
if  it  be  clearly  unconstitutional,  or  if  only  presumably  so.     To  deny 
this  would  be  seriously  to  fetter  all  deliberative  proceedings. 
With  great  respect, 

Truly  yours, 

Edward  McPheeson."* 

Fortified  by  such  testimony  as  the  above,  I  maintain,  therefore,  (1.) 
That  by  "order"'  is  meant  conformity  to  prescribed  "rwfes  of  order'' 
for  procedure  in  business ;  (2.;  That  nothing  is  a  ''point  of  order  "'  which 
does  not  relate  to  these  rules ;  (3.)  That  our  parliamentary  rules  of  order 
are  no  part  of  our  constitution ;  (4.)  That  constitutional  rules  are  no  part 
of  the  rules  of  order ;  (5.)  That  Presbytery  had  no  right  to  interpret 
the  constitution,  bind  its  interpretation  upon  the  court,  and  turn  it 
into  a  rule  of  order  ;  (6.)  That  Presbytery  had  no  right  to  legislate  a 
new  rule  into  existence  conflicting  with  the  binding  decision  of  the 
Assembly;  (7.)  That  a  man  is  always  "  in  order"  when  he  conforms 
to  the  rules  of  order,  and  only  "out  of  order"  when  he  departs  from 
the  same;  (8.)  That  a  man  may  be  perfectly  "in  order"  when  his 
motion  is  utterly  rmconstitutional,  and  his  motion  may  be  perfectly 
constitutional,  when  the  man  himself  is  utterly  "  out  of  order." 

I  need  say  no  more  on  this  first  point  of  complaint.  I  complain  that 
the  dearest  right  of  a  Presbyterian  minister,  protected  by  a  true  con- 
struction of  the  constitution  and  by  parliamentary  rules,  to  both 
which  I  conformed,  were  taken  from  me,  on  the  floor  of  the  Presby- 
tery, by  an  arbitrary  decision  of  that  body,  and  this  action  I  submit 
to  the  judgment  of  the  Synod. 

II.  The  second  point  of  Com|)laint  is  against  the  Presbytery's  action, 
in  accepting,  and  thereby  making  official  documents  of,  the  Special 
Report  and  collaterals  of  the  Committee  of  Investigation  in  the  case  of 

*  The  communications  from  Mr.  Colfax  and  Mr.  McPherson  I  did  not  receive 
till  after  the  meeting  of  Synod.  I  have  talien  the  liberty  to  Insert  them  in  the 
speech.  -     T.  H.  S. 


41 

Mr,  McCune,  "  idthout  any  action  whatever  to  amend  or  to  rectify  statements, 
judgments,  and  personalities  therein  contained,  at  variance  with  Righteous- 
ness and  Truth."  This,  of  course,  relates  wholly  to  myself  and  the  Pres- 
bytery. I  complain  of  no  statements,  judgments,  or  personalities,  in 
reference  to  any  one  else. 

(1.)  The  first  reason  in  support  of  this  second  point  of  Complaint  is, 
"That  the  Report  opens  with,  and  its  recommendations  rest  upon, 
statements  contrary  to  truth.^' 

(a.)  It  says,  my  Resolution,  offered  at  Glendale,  and  printed  in  my 
pamphlet,  was  a  "Resolution  censuring  Mr.  McCune."  This  is  not 
true.  The  Resolution  simply  asked  Presbytery  to  "reject  the  princi- 
ples" Mr.  McCune  has  advocated,  and  to  say  that  the  ''  course  pursued'' 
is  in  ^'contravention"  of  our  law,  and  "inconsistent"  with  membership 
in  our  body.  It  relates  wholly  to  things,  proper  to  be  acted  upon  by 
the  episcopal  power  of  the  body.  It  proposes  no  "  censure "  of  the 
person,  not  even  an  admonition.  It  implies  no  censure  whatever.  It 
is  just  what  our  Church  has  done  scores  of  times,  without  censure, 
and  repeats  every  time  upon  "review  and  control"  of  Records,  and 
in  public  deliverances  whenever  necessary. 

(b.)  It  says  my  pamphlet  made  "  light  of  the  Committee  and  its 
work,"  In  no  paragraph,  sentence,  or  clause  of  my  pamphlet,  can  a 
syllable  be  found  authenticating  such  a  charge,  or  reflecting  in  the 
slightest  degree  upon  the  "  the  Committee  and  its  work."  The  statement 
is  wholly  gratuitous. 

(c.)  It  says,  that  my  pamphlet  "  contains  the  staple  and  authority  for 
the  rumors  existing  against  Mr.  McCune."  This  also  is  untrue.  My 
pamphlet  was  itself  the  product  of  "rumors,''  and  of  various  publica- 
tions, as  also  of  previous  discussions,  long  before  the  pamphlet  was 
born  ;  and  this  was  well  known  to  the  Committee.  It  was  neither  the 
staple,  nor  the  authority,  ^'■for  the  rumors  existing,"  at  the  time  of  its 
publication,  nor  at  the  time  of  Presbytery's  appointment  of  its  Com- 
mittee. And  none  knew  this  better  than  the  draftsman  of  the  Report, 
Dr.  J.  Gr.  Montfort.  The  pamphlet  was  published  about  two  weeks 
after  the  Presbytery  arose  at  Glendale,  April  13,  1876.  Now  then. 
Moderator,  I  affirm  that  Mr.  McCune's  book  on  "  Organic  Uniou  "  was 
published  in  1866,  and  has  since  been  fully  circulated.  The  "  Chris- 
tian Unity,"  edited  by  Mr.  McCune,  appeared  in  November,  1873. 
Dr.  Monfort's  adverse  criticism  upon  the  principles  of  that  paper  ap- 
peared in  the  same  month,  saying:  "It  will  be  seen  that  Bro. 
McCune  aims  at  a  great  change  in  the  Churches."  In  August,  1875, 
this  same  widely-circulated  paper  contained  an  editorial  by  the  drawer 
of  the  report.     He  says,  in   that  editorial,  among  other  things:  "  If 


42 

these  brethren  are  for  orgauization  and  association,  or  are  already  or- 
ganized and  associated,  the  external  bond  of  union  being  the  conven- 
tion or  association  which  met  in  New  York  in  1873,  in  Cincinnati  in 
1874,  and  in  Suffolk,  Va.,  in  1875,  we  are  at  a  hss  to  understaiid  how 
Mr.  McCune  or  Mr.  Mellish  can  be  willing  to  maintain  connection 
with  the  Presbyterian  or  Baptist  Church,  We  should  suppose  that 
each  would  pass  at  once  for  an  old  organization  that  is  unauthorized 
and  extra-scriptural  to  a  new  one  on  a  New  Testament  Basis." 
"The  Address  to  all  Christian  Ministers  and  Chui'ches  in  North 
America"  was  issued  in  1874.  A  long  debate  between  Mr.  McCune 
and  the  Christian  Standard  occurred  in  1875  and  the  earlier  part  of 
1876.  The  L.  and  M.  L.  "Declaration  and  Basis,"  and  the  Council 
were  in  the  latter  part  of  1875;  and  the  Herald  and  Presbyter 
published  the  proceedings,  as  did  other  papers.  Public  discussions  by 
Messrs.  McCune,  Morris,  Skinner,  and  Layman,  besides,  occurred  in 
the  Cincinnati  Gazette,  Commercial,  and  Times,  also  discussions  in  the 
Christian  Observer,  the  United  Presbyterian,  Interior,  the  Presbyterian, 
the  Journal  and  Messenger,  the  North-western  Christian  Advocate, 
and  other  papers,  all  which  I  pi-esent  as  evidence  for  the  point  I  make, 
before  ever  the  Glendale  Presbytery  met,  or  my  pamphlet  saw  the 
light.  An  interlocutory  meeting  had  even  been  proposed  in  reference 
to  this  matter.  The  opening  sentences  of  my  pamphlet  are  themselves 
a  refutation  of  the  Committee's  statement.  The  resolution  of  the 
Presbytery  under  which  the  Committee  was  appointed,  and  beginning 
thus,  "  Wheras,  for  some  time  past  there  have  been  current  rumors,"  etc., 
— a  form  of  expression  penned  by  the  drawer  of  the  report  himself, — 
seals  the  allegation  of  the  Committee  as  untrue.  With  what  con- 
science, then,  or  with  what  sense  of  justice  or  of  truth,  could  the 
drawer  of  the  report  and  the  Committee  base  their  report  upon  the 
false  statement  that  my  pamphlet  was  the  '■'staple  and  authority  for 
the  rumors  existing,"  in  "  time  past,"  and  into  which  they  were  appointed 
to  inquire,  before  the  pamphlet  was  born  ?  On  this  I  need  say  no  more, 
except  that  nothing  could  be  more  unjust  or  untrue  than  the  attempt 
to  make  me  the  author  of  Common  Fame;  a  device  contrived  (1), 
to  cut  away  any  Presbyterial  action  on  the  ground  of  Common  Fame 
in  the  case,  and  (2)  to  lay  the  ground  that  I  be  required  to  become  a 
responsible  prosecutor.  Thus  does  the  report  of  the  Committee  open 
with,  and  its  recommendations  rest  upon,  three  unfounded  statements. 
(2.)  The  second  reason  in  support  of  the  second  point  of  Complaint 
is,  that  this  accepted  report  steps  out  of  its  way  to  raise  a  new  ca»e, 
instead  of  confining  itself  to  the  terms  of  the  resolution  under  which 
the  Committee  was  appointed."    This  policy,  in  the  light  of  the  pre- 


43 

ceding  untruthfulness,  was  evidently  to  my  damage  before  the  public 
and  was  beyond  the  province  of  the  Committee.  The  terms  of  that 
resolution  were,  to  have  a  ''full  conference  Avith  Mr.  McCune,  ' 
and  to  inquire  into  all  the  "facts"  bearing  on  the  "case"  of  Mr. 
McCune,  and  report  to  Presbytery.  Under  these  instructions  the 
Committee  assumes  to  pronounce  upon  me  personally  and  upon  tlie 
publication  of  my  pamphlets,  written  in  defense  of  my  rights  as  a 
Presbyter,  and  of  the  faith  and  order  of  the  Church,  a  condemnatory 
judgment.  It  recommends  that  I  be  dealt  with  for  publishing  the 
pamphlet.  My  mouth  having  been  closed  in  the  G-lendale  Presby- 
tery, I  am  to  be  dealt  with  for  opening  it  outside  of  the  Presbytery, 
and  then  have  it  closed  again  on  the  merits  of  the  case  when  the  Pres- 
bytery met  thereafter.  It  recommends  that  Presbytery  take  action 
to  the  effect  that  I  either  "  prove  or  retract"  certain  picked  state- 
ments by  Mr.  McCune,  and  that  I  "ought''  so  to  do,  in  default  of 
which,  it  suggests  a  prosecution  for  "slander.'"  Was  this,  Moderator, 
the  work  the  Committee  was  sent  to  do  under  the  terms  of  the  reso- 
lution, recommending  no  action  whatever  in  the  case  it  was  appointed 
to  examine,  and  the  material  "facts"  of  which  case  it  was  required  to 
present  to  the  Presbytery.  It  turned  aside  to  do  as  I  have  intimated. 
I  submit  that  this  was  an  unlawful  exercise  of  the  functions  of  the 
Committee,  in  the  interest  of  a  personal  attack  upon  myself.  And 
yet  Presbytery  accepted  all  this  without  a  word  of  rebuke  or  official 
correction. 

(3.)  The  third  reason  in  support  of  the  second  point  of  Complaint  is, 
"That  it  implies  a  censure  on  the  undersigned  and  recommends  the 
Presbytery  to  pass  a  judgment  which  also  implies  a  censure."  Cen- 
sure for  publication,  censure  in  case  I  declined  to  "  prove  or  retract." 
It  says  I  "  ought''  to  do  one  or  tho  other,  that  is,  I  am  under  moral 
obligation  to  do  this,  and  in  case  I  do  not,  then  a  prosecution  for 
"  slander  "  may  be  the  next  appropriate  step !  What  is  all  this,  Mode- 
rator, but  an  implied  "censure"  of  me  personally  ?  All  this,  I  affirm, 
was  beyond  the  province  of  the  Committee  under  the  terms  of  its 
instructions ;  and  against  this  unprecedented  liberty  I  complain,  as  also 
against  the  formal  acceptance  of  such  a  report,  giving  it  the  sanction  of 
an  official  document,  I  hold  as  firmly  as  any  man  can,  that  a  public 
slanderer  "ought"  to  prove  or  retract,  and  that  no  apologies  short  of 
this  "ought"  to  be  accepted.  Ministerial  character  is  too  precious  to 
be  trifled  with. 

(4.)  The  fourth  reason  in  support  of  the  second  point  of  Complaint 
is,  "That  part  of  the  Collaterals  of  the  Report  indulge  in  gross  person- 
alities against  the  undersigned,  which  would  not  be  tolerated  for  one 


44 

nioinent  in  debate,  aud  ought  not  to  be  tolerated  in  an  official  docu- 
ment/' 

The  Collaterals  are  specified  by  the  Committee  in  their  Special  Re- 
port, and  are  expressly  said  by  them  to  be  a  'part  of  our  report." 
What  they  contain  was  well  known  to  Dr.  Monfort,  the  Chairman  of 
the  Committee,  and  to  the  Committee  itself.  I  think  it  will  be  difficult 
for  any  one  to  sliow  wherein  I  personally  have  violated  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  Christian  courtesy  or  gentlemanly  respect,  by  the  use  of 
opprobious  and  vituperative  epithets  against  any  one.  I  have  sought 
simply  to  defend  the  faith  and  order  of  my  Church,  in  a  manly  and 
Christian  way.  But  the  Report  of  the  Committee  has  introduced  into 
the  Presbytery  an  array  of  gross  personalities,  the  parallel  to  which 
can  not  be  found  in  any  official  document,  secular  or  political,  in  the 
country.  Collateral  No.  1,  p.  5,  "violent,  unlawful  and  slanderous 
a.S3ault;"  "attacked  and  villified,"  p.  G  ;  "  unrighteous  attempt,"  p.  6  ; 
'•  proposed  to  reach  this  high-handed  and  tyrannical  result,"  p.  7  ; 
"assailing  me  with  a  great  mass  of  quotations  of  garbled  phrases," 
p.  7;  "  shameful  unfairness,"  p  7;  "  flagrantly  unjust,"  "  slanderous," 
"  defiant,"  "disrespectful  to  the  lawful  jurisdiction  of  the  Presbytery," 
"frantic  outcry,"  p.  8;  "  slanderous  charges,"  "crying  injustice,"  p. 
10;  "unprecedented  in  the  history  of  slander,"  p.  5.  Collateral  No. 
4,  "violent,  unlawful  and  contumacious  assault,"  p.  1;  "recklessly 
and  officiously  asserts,"  p.  5;  "defamatory  pamphlet,"  "tyrannical 
and  false  assumption,"  p.  5  Collateral  No.  5,  "untrue  and  slander- 
ous statements,"  p.  3;  "defamer,"  "shamefully  untrue  statements," 
p.  4;  "shameful  and  outrageous  wrong,"  p.  12;  "violently  contuma- 
cious and  defamatory  statements,"  p.  26. 

Moderator,  I  blush  for  my  Church.  I  blush  for  the  degeneracy  of 
manners  that  prevails  in  our  midst,  and  for  that  demoralization  of 
Christian  sentiment  and  propriety  which  could  aliow  our  ears  to  be 
shocked  by  such  things  in  a  court  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  I  hang 
my  head  in  shame.  I  complain  righteously  to  this  body.  Personalities, 
sir,  are  the" order  of  the  day,  and  it  is  time  that  the  Church  of  Christ 
set  its  face  like  a  flint  against  the  enormity.  It  pleased  my  ear,  I  must 
say  it  in  justice  to  some  of  my  brethren,  to  hear  their  expressions  of 
indignation  at  the  character  of  the  Report,  styling  it  "outrageous," 
"  horrid,"  and  ■'  unparalleled  in  the  history  of  the  Church."  But  that 
the  Presbytery  itself,  under  the  lead  of  those  who  controlled  it, 
should  tolerate  and  accept  such  a  Report  without  rebuke,  tells  its  own 
story. 

III.  The  third  point  o?  Complaint  is  against  the  action  of  Presby- 
tery, in  "adopting  an  answer  to  the  protest  of  the  undersigned,  Sep. 


45 

teniher  15tli,  1876,  Mt.   Auburn,  without  rectifying  its  errmieous  state- 
ments and  tlie  false  impression  it  is  calculated  to  make." 

(1.)  My  first  reason  in  support  of  this  third  point  of  Complaint  is, 
"That  said  answer  does  not  accurately  represent  the  facts  of  the  case.'" 
My  second  reason  in  support  of  the  third  point  is,  that  "it  represents 
the  undersigned  as  being  out  of  order  and  furnishing  reasonable  grounds 
for  the  annoyances  and  unlawful  interruptions  under  which  he  was 
forced  to  retire  from  the  floor  of  the  Presbytery."  My  third  reason 
is,  "  that  no  withdraival  of  the  protest  for  alteration,  on  account  of  mis- 
representation in  the  answer,  could  make  the  protest  "  more  agree- 
able" to  the  "views"  of  the  undersigned."  I  take  these  three  reasons 
together,  and  for  the  first  two  of  them  adduce  the  public  reports  of 
the  occurrences  at  Mt.  Auburn,  certified  to,  as  correct  reports,  by  the 
gentlemen  of  the  press  who  made  them.  I  also  present  my  Protest 
and  the  Answer  of  the  Presbytery  to  the  same.  (Here  read  the 
Gazette  and  Commercial  reports.) 

Now,  Moderator,  I  make  the  following  points:  (1.)  I  was  ruled  as 
in  order,  by  the  Chair,  when  reading  the  Special  Report  of  the  Inves- 
tigating Committee.  (2.)  I  never  traversed  that  report  with  "  unlim- 
ited "  range,  as  the  protest  insinuates.  I  confined  myself,  in  the 
first  place,  strictly  to  the  Special  Report ;  and  in  the  second  place, 
closely  to  one  paragraph  of  that  report,  printed  as  No.  2  in  the  Ga- 
zette, reading  it  from  the  print.  I  had  read  precisely  one  inch  and 
three  quarters  by  actual  measurement,  during  over  an  hour's  patient 
and  protracted  effort  to  go  on  uijder  the  ruling  of  the  Moderator.  I 
sought  to  read  nothing  else,  and  I  will  read  now  just  what  I  read  then. 
(Here  read.)  This  is  all,  sir.  There  is  nothing  else  in  that  report 
that  touched  the  question  in  hand.  It  is  therefore  untrue  that  I  was 
indulging  in  "  unlimited  reading,"'  or  that  the  Moderator  called  me 
to  order  on  that  account.  (3.)  All  Mr.  McCune's  objections  and  in- 
terruptions were  directly  to  the  point,  that  I  had  7io  right  to  read  that 
part  of  the  report  which  the  Moderator  ruled  I  had  a  right  to  read,  in 
order  to  show  that  the  Committee  was  as  much  bound  to  prosecute 
Mr.  McCune  as  I  was.  (4.)  I  was  never  called  to  order  once  by  the 
Moderator,  or  as  ruled  out  of  order.  The  Moderator's  remarks,  that  I 
would  confine  myself  to  the  question  and  the  paper,  were  remarks 
made  in  the  midst  of  boundless  confusion,  not  as  calls  of  myself  to  order, 
but  as  simple  repetitions  and  assurances  to  the  court  that,  in  what  I 
should  say  and  read,  I  must  confine  myself  to  the  paper  and  to  the  ques- 
tion, both  which  I  did,  not  that  I  had  transgressed  in  a  single  instance. 
(5.)  The  inch  and  three  quarters  that  I  did  read  was  germane  to  the 
matters  involved  in  the  motion  under  discussion,  as  the  whole  para- 


46 

graph  was,  and  this  I  was  proceeding  to  show,  but  was  prevented  by 
persistent  interruptions,  which  were  not  restrained.  They  coincided  with 
"the  particular  matters"  complained  of,  but  I  was  not  allowed  to  go  on 
and  show  this  fact.  (6.";  The  drawer  of  the  Keport  affirmed  to  me  per- 
sonally, in  my  study,  after  the  Presbytery  was  over,  that  I  had  a  perfect 
right  to  read  that  whole  paragraph,  which  is  six  inches  long  in  print,  and 
that  I  ought  to  have  been  allowed  a  still  larger  range.  It  is  not  true, 
therefore,  as  I  have  shown,  that  I  sought  an  "  unlimited  "  range,  or  that 
I  was  out  of  order,  or  that  I  wandei'ed  from  the  question,  or  that  I  did 
anything  not  pertment  to  the  discussion,  or  that  I  trespassed  the  ruling  of 
the  Chair,  or  that  my  conduct  gave  any  just  ground  for  the  unlawful  in- 
terruptions to  which  I  Avas  subjected,  or  that  in  nearly  or  quite  every 
instance,  the  Moderator  found  it  necessary  to  warn  me  to  keep  within 
his  ruling,  all  which  the  answer  to  the  protest  alleges  as  true,  and  the 
contrary  of  which  I  allege.  The  simple  fact  is  this,  the  determination 
on  the  part  of  several  individuals  was,  that  that  part  Tof  the  Commit- 
tee's report  which  I  was  reading  should  not  be  read  and  I  was  forced 
to  retire,  under  protest  that  I  was  not  protected  in  my  rights.  And 
now,  in  face  of  such  allegations  as  the  above,  in  the  answer  to  the 
protest,  it  must  be  evident  to  every  one,  that  no  ivithdrawal  of  my  pro- 
test by  myself,  could  make  it  "more  agreeable'  to  my  "  views"  or  to 
the  facts  in  the  case,  or  to  my  vindication  against  the  false  impeach- 
ments of  the  answer,  by  any  alteration  that  I  might  make,  and  there- 
fore my  only  resort  is,  to  complain  to  this  body  against  the  injustice 
that  has  been  done. 

And  thus  do  I  sum  up  the  whole  case  of  which  I  complain  :  A  case 
of  grievous  injustice  against  a  man  who  has  simply  sought  to  draw  the 
notice  of  his  Presbytery,  in  these  days  of  demoralization  in  this  region, 
to  endangering  error  and  practice,  under  the  disguise  of  a  false 
unionism  and  liberalism,  which  repels  the  distinctive  tenets  of  our 
creed,  and  the  enforcement  of  denominational  law.  Injustice  in  vio- 
lation of  my  'Constitutional  and  parliamentary  rights,  both  which  have 
been  twice  wrested  from  me  on  the  floor  of  the  Presbytery,  bound  to 
l)rotect  me  in  the  same  ;  injustice  in  accepting  the  Committee's  Ke- 
port, which  opens  with,  and  rests  upon,  three  separate  statements  of 
untruth ;  injustice  in  seeking  to  make  me  the  author  of  the  "  rumors  " 
which,  "in  time  past,"  had  spread  over  the  country,  before  even  my 
pamphlet  was  born  ;  injustice  in  turning  aside  to  institute  a  new  case, 
and  pronounce  on  the  basis  of  those  untruths  a  censuring  judgment 
against  me  personally,  as  also  against  the  public  defense  of  my  rights 
as  a  Presbyter,  and  of  the  faith  and  order  of  the  Presbyterian  Church ; 
injustice   in   asserting  that  I  was  under  moral  obligation  either  to 


47 

•'  prove  or  retract ;  "  injustice  in  recommending  a  judicial  investigation 
of  certain  selected  statements,  on  Mr.  McCune's  representation  alone, 
as  if  my  quotations  or  argument  were  false  on  that  account;  injustice 
for  suggesting  a  prosecution  for  "  slander"  in  case  I  declined  to  accede 
to  the  imputation  in  the  judgment,  that  I  ought  to  "  prove  or  retract;" 
injustice  in  accepting  collaterals  to  the  report,  and  making  them  offi- 
cial documents,  when  they  abounded  in  gross  personalities  and  multi- 
plied vituperative  epithets,  not  tolerated  even  in  the  councils  of  uncon- 
verted men;  injustice  in  representing  me  as  a  persistent  breaker  of 
the  order  of  my  Presbytery,  a  constant  trespasser  upon  the  ruling  of 
the  Chair,  and  the  author  of  the  very  disorder  and  confusion  under 
which  1  was  forced  to  retire  from  the  floor  of  the  Presbytery;  a 
twelve-fold  injustice,  repeated,  protracted,  accumulated,  and  which  I 
here  bring  and  lay  before  the  bar  of  this  Synod,  and  upon  which  I 
ask  the  judgment  of  my  brethren,  and  all  this  injustice,  oppression 
and  wrong,  in  an  effort  to  avoid  and  delay  the  bounden  duty  of  the 
Presbytery,  to  attend  to  the  disorders  which,  by  common  fame,  had 
been  circulated  through  the  country. 

But,  Moderator,  high  over  all  personal  injustice  and  wrong,  looms 
the  great  question  of  the  Episcopal  or  Paternal  Power  of  the  Presby- 
tery to  condemn  error  in  doctrine  and  practice,  apart  from  judicial 
process,  and  so  conserve  the  faith  and  order  of  the  Church.  This 
power,  expressly  vested  in  the  Presbytery,  and  in  all  our  courts,  by 
Christ,  the  Head  of  the  Church,  and  engraved  in  the  constitution 
itself,  Cincinnati  Presbytery  has  repudiated.  It  is  a  dangerous  re- 
lapse. To  the  Presbyterian  Church,  to-day,  as  ever,  belongs  the 
whole  power  of  the  apostolic  Ciiurch,  save  its  miraculous  and  extra- 
ordinary to  oversee  and  govern  the  flock  of  G-od,  a  plenary  power  ad- 
ministered in  fidelity  centuries  before  our  forms  of  "  actual  process'' 
were  recorded.  To  each  minister  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  belongs 
the  whole  ordinary  power  of  the  apostles,  to  watch,  govern  and  direct, 
to  reprove,  rebuke  and  exhort  with  all,  long  suffering  and  doctrine, 
apart  from  judicial  forms.  Who  will  say  that  the  Presbytery  has  not 
the  inherent  power  which  belongs  inherently  to  each  minister  and 
elder  who  composes  it  ?  Sir,  it  is  more  than  a  fallacy  to  say  that  the 
doctrine  and  order  of  the  house  of  God  can  not  be  protected  under 
our  constitution,  except  by  forensic  process.  The  prophets  contradict 
it.  The  New  Testament  contradicts  it.  The  apostolic  example  con- 
tradicts it.  The  practice  of  the  Church  in  every  age  contradicts  it. 
Every  apostolic  epistle  is  a  loud  protest  against  it.  The  history 
of  the  Presbyterian,  and  every  other  Evangelical  Church  in  Chris- 
tendom,   contradicts   it.      And   woe  to   the    Church   of  Christ,    the 


48 

day  when  she  puts  herself  at  the  mercy  of  every  tenacious  inventor  of 
doctrine,  or  every  reviver  of  heresies  exploded  a  thousand  times,  who 
makes  use  of  her  standards  to  shackle  her  freedom,  and  dares  her  to 
move  one  step  in  vmdication  of  her  creed,  unless  at  the  expense  of 
perpetual  judicial  war.  Sir,  my  heart  and  my  head  alike  are  in  this 
great  matter ;  I  want  to  save  the  anchor.  I  would  have  my  brethren 
pause,  in  this  our  great  Church,  whose  limits  extend  so  wide,  and  re- 
member that  maxim  consecrated  by  so  much  illustration  :   "  times  of 

UNION   ARE   TIMES   OP   PERIL   FOR   THE   TRUTH."       And   I   WOuld   have 

them  consider,  too,  the  significance  of  that  other  maxim,  printed  so 
clearly  and  legibly  on  the  page  of  church  history,  viz.:  "  That  every 
schismatic  demands  a  trial ! "  But,  Moderator,  if  the  genius  of  our 
constitution  is  eminent  in  anything,  it  is  in  this,  that  the  mission  of 
the  Church  is  to  bear  testimony  to  the  truth  of  Christ,  and  that  it  is 
the  bounden  duty  of  the  Presbytery,  apart  from  forensic  forms,  to 
condemn  errors  in  doctrine  and  practice,  under  its  own  jurisdiction, 
which  injure  the  unity,  peace  and  purity  of  the  Church.  The  failure 
to  do  this  was  the  source  of  either  increasing  corruption  on  the  one 
hand,  by  i-eason  of  neglect,  or  of  perpetual  war  on  the  other,  by  rea- 
son of  eifort  herein.  First  and  last,  it  is  the  "  heavenly  doctrine"  and 
"  heavenly  order"  we  prize  above  all.  Condemn  the  error  in  doctrine 
and  the  irregularity  in  practice  by  the  episcopal  power  vested  by 
Christ  in  the  ministry  of  His  Church.  Eebuke  and  exhort,  admonish 
and  warn.  Enjoin  all  not  to  propagate  what  is  fatal  to  truth  and 
order.  If  contumacy  follows,  the  remedy  is  at  hand,  without  years  of 
contenticm,  agony,  resistance,  and  regret. 

Moderator  and  brethren,  I  tiiank  you;  I  feel  I  have  discharged  a 
sacred  duty  to  God,  to  my  Church,  to  Christ,  to  you,  in  bringing  this 
matter  before  you.  My  conscience  is  at  rest.  My  heart  beats  warm 
in  hope  that  God  will  bring  good  out  of  this  contest.  Were  it  in  my 
hand  to  do  it,  I  would  arrest  every  unnecessary  judicial  process  for 
false  doctrine,  everywhere,  and  I  would  call  upon  every  court  of  the 
Lord  Jesus  to  stand  to  its  responsibility  in  tlie  exercise  of  legitimate 
episcopal  power,  condemning  erroneous  opinions  and  practices,  so  pre- 
serving to  the  Church  her  noble  polity  and  creed,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  her  unity,  purity  and  peace. 


PROTEST. 

* '  To  the  Synod  of  Cincinnati : 

"  Dear  Brethren — The  undersigned  hereby  protests  against  the 
action  of  the  Synod  of  Cincinnati,  taken  at  its  annual  session,  October 
23,  1876,  in  adopting  the  following  preamble  and  resolutions,  to  wit : 


40 

"  Whereas,  The  issuing  of  tlie  complaint  of  Dr.  Skinner,  as  reoora- 
mended  by  the  Judicial  Committee,  woy  prejudice  the  case  now  known 
as  the  McCune  case,  at  present  pending  before  the  Cincinnati  Presby- 
tery; therefore, 

"  Resolved,  That  the  coiisiaeration  of  the  report  of  the  Judicial 
Committee  upon  the  said  complaint  of  Dr.  Skinner,  be  and  is  hereby 
postponed  until  the  issue  of  the  case  of  Mr.  McCuue  by  said  Presbytery." 

My  reasons  for  this  protest,  are  : 

"1.  Because  my  rights  to  a  present  hearing  upon  the  merits  of  my 
particular  case,  which  I  have  closely  and  carefully  discriminated  from 
any  possible  relation  to  the  possible  case  of  Mr.  McCune,  not  yet 
framed,  and  belonging  to  another  court,  is  guaranteed  to  me  by  the 
provisions  of  the  constitution,  all  the  conditions  necessary  as  to  this 
having  been  by  me  fulfilled. 

"2.  Because  the  argument  of  the  Preamble,  that  the  present  hearing  of 
ray  complaint  in  this  court,  utterly  distinct  from  a  case  not  yet  framed, 
nor  presented  to  another  and  lower  court,  would  be  just  as  good  in  the 
lower  court  against  the  hearing  of  Mr.  McCune's  case,  when  it  shall 
be  presented,  if  any  such  connexion  exists  between  them  as  the 
Preamble  assumes.  Each  case  must  stand  upon  its  own  merits,  and 
each  court  must  judge  for  itself. 

"3.  Because  the  Sjnod  had  no  official  knowledge  of  my  complaint, 
while  its  character  was  misrepresented  by  individuals,  the  complaint 
itself  never  having  been  so  much  as  read,  and  equally,  has  no  official 
knowledge  of  the  case,  yet  to  be,  of  Mr.  McCune.  The  Judicial 
Committee,  in  neither  of  its  reports,  either  described  my  complaint,  or 
made  a  solitary  quotation  from  it. 

"4.  Because  the  Judicial  Committee  had  unanimously  reported  that 
my  complaint  was  'in  order,'  and  had  been  regularly  conducted,  and 
recommended  that  it  be  taken  up  by  the  Synod,  and  the  Synod  voted 
to  take  up  my  complaint. 

"5.  Because  even  a  refusal  to  consider  the  Judicial  Committee's 
'repo^i,'  as  the  resolution  has  it,  and  which  declared  that  my  complaint 
Avas  '  in  order,'  is  not  only  a  refusal  by  the  Synod  to  hear  now  my 
complaint,  and  to  which  hearing  I  have  a  perfect  right,  but  is  a  refusal 
to  decide,  even  now,  ichether  there  is  any  complaint  at  all  by  me  recjtdarly 
in  order  before  this  body,  and  entitled  note  to  be  heard.  It  was  a  practical 
ejection  of  my  complaint  from  the  Synod. 

"  6.  Because  it  is  a  repetition,  now  the  third  time  during  six  months, 
of  the  very  thing  of  which  I  complain  to  this  body  as  previously  twice 
practiced  upon  me  in  the  court  below,  viz:  The  setting  aside  of  my 
present  constitutional  rights  by  the  exercise  of  an  assumed  discretion- 
ary power,  excluded  by  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  itself  in  all 
cases  where  such  rights  are  involved. 

"For  these  reasons  I  repectfully  protest,  and  give  notice  of  com- 
plaint to  the  General  Assembly. 

"Yours  fraternally, 

"  Thomas  H.  Skinner." 
"  Lebanon,  O.,  Oct.  24,  1876." 


50 


NOTICE   OF   COMPLAINT    TO   THE    GENERAL    ASSEMBLY. 

"  To  the  Moderator  of  the  Synod  of  Cincinnati : 

"  The  undersigned  hereby  respectfully  gives  notice  of  his  complaint 
to  the  General  Assembly,  against  the  following  action  of  the  Synod  of 
Cincinnati,  October  23,  1876,  to  wit : 

"  '  Whereas,  The  issuing  of  the  complaint  of  Dr.  Skinner,  as  recom- 
mended by  the  Judicial  Committee,  may  prejudice  the  case,  now  known 
as  the  McCune  case,  at  present  pending  before  the  Cincinnati  Pres- 
bytery; therefore, 

"  *  Resolved,  That  the  consideration  of  the  report  of  the  Judicial 
Committee  upon  the  said  complaint  of  Dr.  Skinner  be,  and  hereby  is, 
postponed  until  the  issue  of  the  case  of  Mr.  McCune  by  said  Presbytery.' 

"  My  reasons  for  this  complaint  are  : 

"  First,  Because  the  above  action  excluded  the  undersigned  from 
a  hearing  on  his  complaint  to  which  he  was  entitled  both  by  constitu- 
tional and  parliamentary  law. 

**  Second,  Because  the  preamble  specifying  the  ground  of  the  Synod's 
action  offered  no  good  and  sufficient  showing  for  setting  aside  the  vested 
ecclesiastical  rights  of  the  undersigned. 

"Third,  Because  such  action  is  an  encouragement  of  insubordination 
in  the  lower  courts,  and  is  destructive,  not  only  of  individual  rights, 
but  of  the  peace,  purity,  and  unity  of  the  Church. 

"  OcTonER  27,  1876.  "  Thomas  H.  Skinner." 

"  The  undersigned  unite  with  the  Rev.  T.  H.  Skinner,  D.  D.,  in  the 
above  cojuplaint  to  the  General  Assembly. 

"  T.  Charles  Thomas,  Nathanial  West, 

"  W.  B.  Spence,  R.  H.  Leonard, 

"  Henry  W.  Biggs,  Edward  H.  Camp, 

"  J.  Gamble,  E.  I).  Ledyard. 
"  L.  H.  Long, 


ACTION  OF  the  SESSION  OF  THE  SECOND  PRESBYTERIAN  CHURCH. 

"  '  Resolved,  that  the  session  of  the  Second  Presbyterian  Church  of 
Cincinnati,  in  full  sympathy  with  our  Pastor  in  his  efforts  to  maintain 
the  faith  and  order  of  the  Presbyterian  standards,  and  to  secure  respect 
by  the  lower  courts  for  vested  ecclesiastical  rights,  unite  with  him  in 
his  complaint  to  the  General  Asembly." 

"October  30,  1876." 

"J.  Burnet  Jr.,  Clerk  of  Session. 
"  James  Taylor,         Wm.  H.  Neff, 
"  Wm.  H.  Allen,        S.  J.  Broadwell, 
"E.  H.  Pendleton,    Wm.  H,  Mussey." 


51 


ACTION  OF   THE  BOARD  OF   TRUSTEES. 

"  Resolved,  That  we,  the  undersigned,  Trustees  of  the  Second 
Presbyterian  Church  of  Cincinnati,  being  in  full  accord  and  sympathy 
with  our  Pastor  in  his  efforts  to  maintain  the  faith  and  order  of  the 
Presbyterian  standards,  and  to  secure  respect  by  the  lower  courts  for 
vested  ecclesiastial  rights,  unite  with  him  in  his  complaint  to  the 
Oeneral  Assembly. 

"November  6,  1876. 

"  Wm.  Woods,  John  Shillito,  President. 

"■  Geo.  Wilshire,  Thornton  M.  Hinkle,  Sec. 

"John  A.  Murphy,  A.  S.  Winslow." 
"  G.  P.  Griffith, 


action  of  the  deacons. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Deacons  of  the  Second  Presbyterian  Church,  of 
Cincinnati,  in  full  sympathy  Avith  the  Session,  the  Trustees  and  the 
Pastor,  do  cordifilly  unite  with  the  Pastor  in  the  above  complaint  to 
the  General  Assembly. 

"  D.  B.  LuPTON, 
"  H.  P.  Lloyd, 
"  Wm,  Hubbell  Fisher, 
"Geo.  a.  Prichard." 
November  6,  1876. 


"The   undersigned,    members  and   Elders  of  other   Presbyterian 

■Churches  of  the  city  of  Cincinnati,  also  unite  in  the  above  complaint. 

"  F.  T.  LocKWOOD,  W.  W.  Scarborough, 

"  Francis  Ferry,  H.  Stewart, 

"  Alex.  M.  Johnson,  Geo.  W.  McAlpin, 

"  Hugh  McBirney,  Wm.  Clendenin, 

"  Richard  Smith,  M.  W.  Oliver, 

"Theo.  Kempe;r,  Ira.  Ha\nes, 

"John  W.  Caldwell,  J.C.Bradford. 


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